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Saving Face: Adopting a Right of Publicity to Protect North
Carolinians in an Increasingly Digital World*
Who steals my purse steals trash; 'tis something, nothing;
'Twas mine, 'tis his, and has been slave to thousands;
But he that filches from me my good name
Robs me of that which not enriches him,
And makes me poor indeed.
-WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, OTHELLO act 3, sc. 3
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INTRODUCTION
The right of publicity is the right to control the use of one's
identity.' It has traditionally been viewed as a "celebrity law suit"-a
legal mechanism used to protect the commercial interest of a
celebrity's image, name, or "likeness."2 However, the modern ability
to record and to photograph anything and everyone, combined with
the rise of social media and the increasing tendency to "upload,"
"post," "like," "share," or "+1" everything around us has created a
world in which anyone can become a "celebrity."' In fact, as of
1. See ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ'g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 928 (6th Cir. 2003) ("The right
of publicity . .. has been defined as the inherent right of every human being to control the
commercial use of his or her identity."); J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF
PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY § 1:3, at 3 (2013 ed. 2013).
2. See Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831, 835 (6th Cir.
1983) ("The theory of the right is that a celebrity's identity can be valuable in the
promotion of products, and the celebrity has an interest that may be protected from the
unauthorized commercial exploitation of that identity.").
3. The Internet is replete with instances of instant fame. For example, in 2013, Blake
Wilson, better known as "BatDad," garnered over nine million viewers in three months
for parodying Batman while giving out his fatherly wisdom. He now has a dedicated
YouTube channel and a merchandising website. See BatDad Blake, YOUTUBE,
http://www.youtube.com/channel/UCSjlj6EUWMKFU8IU5yf7tA (last visited May 4,
2014). In 2010 Antoine Dodson found himself famous overnight following a news clip
containing his impassioned warning to an assailant who had previously broken into
Dodson's home and assaulted his sister. Dodson's interview was turned into a YouTube
video and a song. See Elizabeth Gentle, Overnight Internet Sensation Reacts to New-Found
Fame, WAFF 48 NEWS (July 30, 2010), http://www.waff.com/story/12901080/overnight-
Internet-sensation-reacts-to-new-found-fame. However, not all Internet fame is positive or
sought after. The recent phenomenon of so-called "revenge porn"-the practice of posting
nude and intimate photos and videos of an ex-lover to humiliate them-brings unwanted
fame to more and more victims every day. See Susan Moses, Will Ohio Lawmakers
Consider Revenge Porn Ban? WKYC NEWS (Dec. 18, 2013), http://www.wkyc.com/story/
news/crime/2013/12/17/revenge-porn-laws/4057881/ (detailing a recent case of revenge
porn in Ohio).
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November 11, 2013, if you have a Google Account, Google has
reserved the right to use your name, photo, and any action you take
on Google by displaying them in ads and in "other commercial
contexts."4 Facebook has a similar clause in its terms as well.' Thus, it
is likely you have already unknowingly endorsed a whole host of
products in a "celebrityesque" manner. Although Google and
Facebook are blatant about the appropriation of your likeness for
commercial purposes, others likely will not be.' In today's digital and
open world where almost everything on the Internet can be
downloaded, copied, manipulated, and distributed by anyone at any
time, it is becoming increasingly difficult for individuals to control
how their likenesses are used.
In response to this growing difficulty, many states have enacted
right of publicity statutes or broadened the applicability of their
privacy laws.' North Carolina has done neither. However, in recent
years there has been growing momentum for North Carolina to adopt
a statutory right of publicity. In fact, in 2009 the North Carolina
4. In November of 2013, Google updated its Terms of Service. Most of these updates
were minor and routine. However, in the middle of its updated Terms, Google inserted
the following: "If you have a Google Account, we may display your Profile name, Profile
photo, and actions you take on Google or on third-party applications connected to your
Google Account (such as +1's, reviews you write and comments you post) in our Services,
including displaying in ads and other commercial contexts." Google Terms of Service,
GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/intl/en/policies/terms/ (last modified April 14, 2014).
Google is expressly telling you that it plans on using your name, image, and actions-
essentially your persona-for marketing purposes. If you own a Google Account, you are
now a celebrity whose persona has viable commercial value.
5. See Statement of Rights and Responsibilities, FACEBOOK 1 10,
https://www.facebook.comlegal/terms (last modified Nov. 15, 2013) ("You give us
permission to use your name, profile picture, content, and information in connection with
commercial, sponsored, or related content (such as a brand you like) served or enhanced
by us. This means, for example, that you permit a business or other entity to pay us to
display your name and/or profile picture with your content or information, without any
compensation to you. If you have selected a specific audience for your content or
information, we will respect your choice when we use it.").
6. See, e.g., In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litig., 724
F.3d 1268, 1271-72 (9th Cir. 2013) (detailing how video game maker EA Sports used
various collegiate athletes images and likeness without their consent); see also Sonya
Hamasaki, California Man Charged in 'Revenge Porn' Case, CNN (Dec. 10 2013),
http://www.cnn.com/2013/12/10/justice/california-revenge-porn-arrest/ (describing how a
California man exploited private images of various women to his advantage).
7. See infra Table 2 (showing that eleven states have adopted or revised a statutory
right of publicity within the past twenty years). In addition, Arizona, Colorado, New
Hampshire, South Carolina, and West Virginia have all expanded their common law to
cover right of publicity actions within the last fifteen years. See infra Table 1 and
corresponding notes.
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General Assembly considered such a bill.' As recently as June 2013,
the Sports and Entertainment Law Section of the North Carolina Bar
Association published an article by well-known right of publicity
activist Jonathan Faber.' In the article, Faber criticizes the proposed
2009 bill as being too weak and calls on North Carolina to enact an
"undiluted" right of publicity statute.10 However, the proposed 2009
statute and the "undiluted" statute promoted by Faber both fail to
appreciate the changing landscape of technology and the potential for
anyone to be a celebrity. This Comment focuses on the need for
North Carolina to update its statutory law in order to protect the
significant interest of all its citizens in controlling the use of their
likenesses. In doing so, this Comment argues that North Carolina
should consider the varied interests and rights at stake in crafting its
right to publicity jurisprudence and adopt a statutory legal scheme
that will adequately balance the growing interest North Carolinians
have in protecting their likenesses with the traditional interests of the
First Amendment.
Analysis proceeds in four parts. Part I introduces the right of
publicity and describes its evolution out of the right of privacy. Part II
explains the moral and the economic justifications for a right of
publicity, highlighting how the right conflicts with the interests of
expression and speech found in the First Amendment and how
different jurisdictions have attempted to balance those interests. Part
III then looks to how these competing interests have played out on
the national level and examines the problems and benefits with the
current national trend. Part IV presents the normative thesis of this
Comment and examines how North Carolina's current privacy laws
fail to adequately protect the privacy and pecuniary interests of its
citizens. It then recommends a path forward, which includes adopting
a statutory right of publicity in North Carolina that attempts to adopt
the best parts of the national trend without strangling the First
Amendment.
8. H.B. 327, 2009-2010 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2009).
9. Jonathan Faber is an adjunct professor of law at Indiana University, founder and
CEO of the Luminary Group, and a nationally recognized advocate of right of publicity
claims. See Jonathan L. Faber, ROBERT H. MCKINNEY SCHOOL OF LAW (2014), http://
mckinneylaw.iu.edu/faculty-stafflprofile.cfm?Id=268; Jonathan Faber, LUMINARYGROUP,
http://www.luminarygroup.comlexecutive-bios/ (last visited May 4, 2014).
10. Jonathan Faber, Lessons Learned: Legislative Right of Publicity Efforts
Throughout U.S. Could Be Instructive for North Carolina's Legislature, FRONT Row, June
2013, at 4,6.
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I. THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY
A. The Genesis
As one commentator remarked, the right of publicity was
"carved out of the general right of privacy," "[1]ike Eve from Adam's
rib."n The right to privacy, in turn, was born out of an 1890 law
review article by Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis. 12 Troubled by
new inventions capable of recording and photographing private acts
and circulating them through the community," Warren and Brandeis
borrowed the term "privacy" from an English case, Albert v.
Strange,14 to coin what they described as the individual's "right to be
let alone.""s They reasoned that the right of privacy was a natural
evolution of common law principles as applied to new
developments. 6 As such, they argued that the violation of privacy
should be recognized at common law as an actionable injury, like the
common law injuries of assault, nuisance, libel, and slander."
Following the publication of the Warren and Brandeis article, courts
split on the idea of a common law right to privacy. In fact, while some
courts quickly accepted the idea," it was the New York courts' rapid
refusal to recognize a common law right of privacy 9 that drove New
York to pass the nation's first privacy statute.20
However, it was not until fifty years after the first privacy statute
was enacted that the right of publicity emerged. In Haelan
Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc.,21 the Second Circuit
11. MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 5.61, at 539.
12. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV.
193 (1890).
13. Id. at 195.
14. Albert v. Strange, (1849) 41 Eng. Rep. 1171 (Ch.) 1171-72, 1179. Strange involved
a suit brought by Prince Albert to prevent the defendant from publishing etchings that he
and Queen Victoria had drawn for their own entertainment. Id. Lord Cottenham ruled for
Prince Albert and used the term "privacy" to define the right that had been violated. Id.
15. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 12, at 193.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 193-94.
18. See, e.g., Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68, 73 (Ga. 1905) (holding
that privacy was an individual right that could be violated).
19. See, e.g., Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 64 N.E. 442, 447 (N.Y. 1902)
("An examination of the authorities leads us to conclude that the so-called 'right of
privacy' has not as yet found an abiding place in our jurisprudence .... ").
20. See N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50-51 (McKinney 2009); see also Denis O'Brien,
The Right of Privacy, 2 COLUM. L. REV. 437, 437-38 (1902) (detailing the public outcry
against the Robertson ruling).
21. 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 1953).
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explicitly recognized the right of publicity as a distinct right separate
from the right to privacy.22 In Haelan, the trial court rejected the
plaintiff's argument that it had acquired the exclusive use of a
baseball player's photograph and held that the right of privacy was a
nontransferable personal right.23 The Second Circuit disagreed,24 and
in one stroke, the court carved the right of publicity out of the right of
privacy. Writing for the court, Judge Jerome Frank stated, "We think
that, in addition to and independent of that right of privacy .. . a man
has a right in the publicity value of his photograph . . .. "I Judge
Frank then noted that "[t]his right might be called a 'right of
publicity.' "26
Immediately following its birth in Haelan, the right of publicity's
popularity ebbed and flowed. 27 However, in 1977 the United States
Supreme Court recognized the right of publicity as a valid state law
claim,' and by the 1980s, the existence of the right was widely
accepted. 29 Today, at least forty-one states have recognized the right
of publicity by statute or through common law,30 and the right has
been incorporated into the Restatement (Third) of Unfair
Competition."
22. Id. at 868.
23. See id. at 867-68.
24. Id. at 868.
25. Id.
26. Id. Following Judge Frank's christening of the right of publicity in Haelan,
commentators jumped into the fray, and in 1954, Melville Nimmer published a law review
article expanding Judge Frank's short sketch of the right of publicity into a full academic
defense. Melville B. Nimmer, The Right of Publicity, 19 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 203
(1954). Oddly, an article written by William Prosser in 1960 has often been incorrectly
attributed as the birth of the right of publicity. See, e.g., Gionfriddo v. Major League
Baseball, 114 Cal. Rptr. 307, 313 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001) ("The common law right of publicity
derives from the fourth category of invasion of privacy identified by Dean Prosser . . . .");
Andrew Beckerman-Rodau, Toward a Limited Right of Publicity: An Argument for the
Convergence of the Right of Publicity, Unfair Competition and Trademark Law, 23
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 132, 139 (2012) ("The appropriation action
identified by Prosser appears to have been the basis for the right of publicity....").
However, Prosser's article, which defined the right of privacy into four separate torts, was
published six years after Nimmer's article and seven years after Haelan. See William L.
Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REv. 383, 389 (1960).
27. See MCCARTHY, supra note 1, §§ 1:29-31, at 59-65.
28. Zachinni v. Scripps Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 566-67 (1977).
29. See MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 1:31, at 65 ("By the mid 1980s, the initial phase of
questioning what the right of publicity was and why it should exist passed largely into
history.").
30. See infra Table 2.
31. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION §§ 46-49 (1993).
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B. Distinguishing the Right of Publicity from the Right to Privacy
Even though the right of publicity has been widely accepted as
distinct from the right of privacy, the two are often still conflated.32
While it is true that the right of publicity and the right to privacy
derive from a common ancestor,3 3 they are separate causes of action
aimed at protecting separate interests.3
The right to privacy focuses on an individual's right to be free
from unwanted attention and protects an individual from outside
parties publicizing his personal information." It is a personal right
primarily concerned with a specific person's feelings.3 6 Privacy
violations are tortious in nature and, as such, remedies focus on
compensating the victim for resulting mental, emotional, and
reputational injuries. In contrast, the right of publicity is concerned
with the unauthorized use of an individual's identity." The remedies
for right of publicity violations focus on recovering the economic
value of a persona, as opposed to compensating for emotional or
mental anguish."
For instance, the right of publicity and the right of privacy would
treat an individual who willingly publishes a photo on a public social
media site such as Facebook or Google+ differently. The user will
have a hard time recovering damages under a privacy action because
proving that emotional or mental anguish resulted from the use of a
picture that she intentionally published on a public site would be
32. Much of the confusion around the two terms stems from two events. The first is
New York's steadfast insistence that their privacy statute encompasses a right to publicity.
See Stephano v. News Grp. Publ'ns, Inc., 474 N.E.2d 580, 584 (N.Y. 1984). The second is
an article written by William Prosser in which he equates the right of publicity with the
privacy tort of misappropriation. Prosser, supra note 26, at 406-07 (citation omitted) ("It
seems sufficiently evident that appropriation is quite a different matter from intrusion,
disclosure of private facts, or a false light in the public eye . . . . Its proprietary nature is
clearly indicated by a decision of the Second Circuit that an exclusive license has what has
been called a 'right of publicity .....
33. See supra Part I.A.
34. Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831, 834 (6th Cir. 1983)
("[T]he right of privacy and the right of publicity protect fundamentally different interests
and must be analyzed separately.").
35. See id.
36. See MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 1:11, at 17.
37. See id. § 11:26, at 747.
38. See id. § 1:3, at 3.
39. See generally id. §§ 11:30-31, at 762-64 (noting that damages for a violation of the
right of publicity are typically based on commercial or economic injury, rather than mental
or emotional injury).
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difficult, to say the least.4 In contrast, to recover under a right of
publicity action, the burden of proving mental or emotional injury is
removed, and all the plaintiff must prove is unauthorized use.4 1
This distinction between the "private" and "public" person is one
of the main reasons the right of publicity developed in the first
place.42 As Melville Nimmer highlighted in his article, the traditional
law of privacy was intended to protect the private person from
unwanted intrusion and was not designed to protect the public person
who intentionally puts herself before the public.43 Conversely, the
right of publicity evolved specifically to protect the public person by
providing a means by which she could recover, not for emotional or
mental anguish caused by an invasion of privacy, but for pecuniary
damage caused by unauthorized use of her image."
II. BALANCING COMPETING INTERESTS
As one commentator remarked, "[1]egal rights typically do not
exist in a vacuum .... [T]he unintended consequences or externalities
that result from any legal right create collisions with competing
rights."45 This is certainly true of the right of publicity. Since its
inception, many commentators have argued that the right of publicity
intrudes upon the freedoms of speech and expression protected by
the First Amendment and that the right should be limited in its
40. In fact, if it was posted on Google+ or Facebook one explicitly grants the
companies the right to use one's image. See supra notes 4 and 5. Thus, it would be hard to
argue that having a third party use that same photograph to promote a product is
somehow more mentally or emotionally damaging. This is especially true if it is to
promote a product that one has publicly "liked" or otherwise recommended.
41. See Shamsky v. Garan, Inc., 632 N.Y.S.2d 930, 933 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995) ("[The
right of publicity] 'consists of only two elements: the commercial use of a person's name or
photograph and the failure to procure the person's written consent for such use.' "
(citation omitted)); see also Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 351 N.E.2d 454, 458
(Ohio 1976), rev'd on other grounds, 433 U.S. 562 (1977) ("The interest which the law
protects is that of each individual to the exclusive use of his own identity, and that interest
is entitled to protection from misuse whether the misuse is for commercial purposes or
otherwise.").
42. Nimmer, supra note 26, at 204-06.
43. Id.
44. See id. at 203-04; see also Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players
Ass'n, 95 F.3d 959, 976 (10th Cir. 1996) ("Publicity rights ... are meant to protect against
the loss of financial gain, not mental anguish."); MCCARTHY, supra note 1, §§ 11:30-31, at
766-67 (noting that damages for right of publicity violations are based on commercial
value).
45. Beckerman-Rodau, supra note 26, at 148.
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application, if not altogether abolished.' However, others argue that
the right of publicity protects a fundamental right "to the fruit of
[one's] labors."4 7 This argument presumes that there is an innate right
to own one's identity and persona48 and that the right should be
broadly applied. This Part discusses the most popular justifications for
adopting a right of publicity and the competing concerns of the First
Amendment. It then provides an overview of how different
jurisdictions have balanced these interests.
A. Justifications for a Right of Publicity
Recognizing the need for a legal mechanism by which public
personas could control the use of their identity, Nimmer provided the
first justification for the right of publicity in his 1954 article.49 Relying
on the axiom of Anglo-American jurisprudence "that every person is
entitled to the fruit of his labors,"s0 Nimmer argued that "unless there
are important countervailing public policy considerations,"
individuals should be entitled to the fruit of their public personas,
which are often created only through "expend[ing] considerable time,
effort, skill, and even money."5' In the ensuing decades, justifications
for the right of publicity have become more wide-ranging and include
both economic and moral justifications.
Commentators have articulated various economic justifications
for a right of publicity.52 Most rationales revolve around the
46. See, e.g., Martin Luther King Jr. Ctr. for Soc. Change, Inc. v. Am. Heritage Prod.
Inc., 296 S.E.2d 697, 708 (Ga. 1982) (Welter, J., concurring) (stating that the right of
publicity "created an open-ended and ill-defined force which jeopardizes a right of
unquestioned authenticity-free speech"); Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Who Put the
Right in the Right of Publicity?, 9 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L. & POL'Y 35, 53-54
(1998) ("Publicity rights, in other words, are a kind of content-based regulation of
speech.").
47. Nimmer, supra note 26, at 216.
48. See generally Alice Haemmerli, Whose Who? The Case for a Kantian Right of
Publicity, 49 DuKE L.J. 383 (1999) (describing how Kantian philosophy and current
cultural mores support a moral argument that individuals have an innate right to control
how their identity is used).
49. See Nimmer, supra note 26, at 216.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. For various economic theories, see, for example, Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League
Baseball Players Ass'n, 95 F.3d 959, 975 (10th Cir. 1996) ("People deserve the right to
control and profit from the commercial value of their identities because, quite simply,
they've earned it."); Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831, 837 (6th
Cir. 1983) (noting the theory of unjust enrichment as supportive of the right of publicity);
Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 603 P.2d 425, 438 (Cal. 1979) (Bird, J., dissenting) ("Often
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"utilitarian" or "tragedy of the commons" theories. The utilitarian
theory argues that when individuals are granted an exclusive right to
the product of their labor, they become more productive and more
inventive than they otherwise would be." The theory posits that,
because an individual cannot possibly capture the entire economic
benefit created from his increased productivity and innovation, this
uncaptured surplus spills over into society and ultimately benefits the
public.5 4 As such, supporters of a broad right of publicity argue that,
just as other property rights incentivize more productive labor," the
right of publicity incentivizes development of a valuable persona.s6
This incentive in turn drives individuals to generate performances,
works, skills, or other products they otherwise would not have
created, which not only enhance their own persona, but also benefit
society at large either aesthetically, economically, or both.s7
considerable money, time and energy are needed to develop one's prominence in a
particular field. Years of labor may be required before [one sees] ... an economic return
through some medium of commercial promotion."); Christopher Pesce, The Likeness
Monster: Should the Right of Publicity Protect Against Imitation?, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 782,
792-93 (1990) ("The right serves to prevent the unjust enrichment of commercial
appropriators. . . .").
53. See JEREMY BENTHAM, THE THEORY OF LEGISLATION 68-69 (Richard Hildreth
trans., Oceana Publ'ns, Inc. 1975) (1789) (describing the basic general tenets of the
incentive-based theory).
54. Richard A. Posner, Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory, 8 J. LEGAL
STUD. 103, 132 (1979) ("The individual may be completely selfish, but ... in a well-
regulated market economy ... the social product of the productive individual ... will
exceed his earnings, [and] such an individual cannot help creating more wealth than he
takes out of society.").
55. See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (8th ed. 2011)
(discussing how property rights encourage individuals to use resources more
productively).
56. See Lugosi, 603 P.2d at 441 (Bird, J., dissenting) ("[Piroviding legal protection for
the economic value in one's identity against unauthorized commercial exploitation creates
a powerful incentive for expending time and resources to develop the skills or
achievements prerequisite to public recognition .... "); Peter L. Felcher & Edward L.
Rubin, The Descendibility of the Right of Publicity: Is There Commercial Life After
Death?, 89 YALE L.J. 1125, 1128 (1980) ("The social policy underlying the right of
publicity is encouragement of individual enterprise and creativity by allowing people to
profit from their own efforts.").
57. See, e.g., Here's Johnny, 698 F.2d at 837 ("Vindication of the right [of publicity]
will tend to encourage achievement in Carson's chosen field."); Steven J. Hoffman,
Limitations on the Right of Publicity, 28 BULL. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y 111, 118 (1980) ("Like
the copyright and patent regimes, the right of publicity may foster the production of
intellectual and creative works by providing the financial incentive for individuals to
expend the time and resources necessary to produce them."). But see Michael Madow,
Private Ownership of Public Image: Popular Culture and Publicity Rights, 81 CALIF. L.
REV. 125, 208-10 (1993) (arguing that incentives generated by the right of publicity are
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The second economic justification offered by proponents of the
right of publicity focuses on avoiding the devaluation of a person's
identity through overuse." This theory suggests that in the same way
that overgrazing of cattle on the proverbial tragic commons would
render the land valueless to the herdsmen,59 not recognizing a right of
publicity would render an individual persona economically valueless
through overuse.' Essentially, the production of too many low value
or low quality products will crowd out the production of the valuable
ones. 6 1 In contrast, just as restricting the use of the commons
optimized its value for herdsmen,62 limiting the use of a person's
likeness optimizes the economic value of her identity.63
unnecessary because: (1) the reward of having a valuable identity is sufficient incentive
itself; (2) restricting the right of publicity would actually increase the incentive for
individuals to create primary goods; and (3) society would be better served by reducing
the incentive to seek fame rather than increasing it).
58. See Matthews v. Wozencraft, 15 F.3d 432, 437-38 & n.2 (5th Cir. 1994) ("Without
the artificial scarcity created by the protection of one's likeness, that likeness would be
exploited commercially until the marginal value of its use is zero .... [I]t soon would be
overused, as each user will not consider the externality effect his use will have on
others."). Put another way, the right of publicity is "needed to ensure that publicity assets
are not wasted by a scramble to use them up as quickly as possible." Mark F. Grady, A
Positive Economic Theory of the Right of Publicity, 1 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 97,98 (1994).
59. See generally Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243
(1968) (detailing the classic application of the tragedy of commons theory).
60. See Grady, supra note 58, at 103-04, 126 (1994) (arguing that without a right of
publicity a celebrity's publicity assets would rapidly dissipate by means of overuse).
61. See id. at 101-02. For example, the popular singer Tom Waits employs a very
unique vocal style. If third parties could copy his voice and style for their own use, the
market would quickly become saturated and the public would grow tired of hearing it,
which would negatively impact the economic value of Waits's actual performances. Waits
v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 1110 (9th Cir. 1992) (noting that allowing Frito-Lay to
run a commercial featuring a sound-alike performer without Waits's consent would
saturate Waits's audience and likely "injure [Waits] commercially"); see also Lahr v. Adell
Chem. Co., 300 F.2d 256, 257, 259 (1st Cir. 1962) (noting that a commercial featuring a
cartoon voiced by someone who specialized in mimicking the plaintiffs voice, "saturated
[the] plaintiffs audience to the point of curtailing his market").
62. See Hardin, supra note 59, at 1245, 1248 (arguing that restricting use of the
commons preserves its value for society as a whole).
63. See Richard A. Posner, The Right of Privacy, 12 GA. L. REV. 393, 411 (1978)
("There is a perfectly good economic reason for assigning the property right in a
photograph used for advertising purposes to the photographed individual: this assignment
assures that the advertiser to whom the photograph is most valuable will purchase it.
Making the photograph the communal property of advertisers would not achieve this
goal."). But see Madow, supra note 57, at 224 ("Advertisers will use A's photograph until
it has been squeezed dry of advertising value .... [But] [w]e are not dealing here with a
nonrenewable natural resource like land .... After all, there would be no 'tragedy' in the
classic parable if the herdsmen, after depleting their common pasture, could simply move
on to another one.").
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Advocates of the right of publicity have also advanced two main
moral justifications for the right of publicity. The first of these follows
the Lockean moral theory that "every person is entitled to the fruit of
his labors."' The argument is largely self-explanatory: if an individual
puts in the effort and the work to cultivate a commercially valuable
identity, then he should be entitled to the economic benefit derived
from that identity."
The second theory is grounded in the idea that a person should
own his identity, not because he has earned it, but because "[i]dentity
[is] something intrinsic to the individual.""6 As articulated by Alice
Haemmerli, proponents of this view offer a moral justification based
on the philosophy of Immanuel Kant rather than John Locke.67
Advocating "a property right based on human freedom,"'
Haemmerli argues that identity should remain "subject to individual
control as an autonomy-based property right, no matter what or who
has affected its level of fame."69 Essentially, the argument is an
academic extension of the innate feeling that, regardless of
circumstance, every person should have the right to control his own
identity and persona. 0 Under this view, it is "damage to the human
64. Nimmer, supra note 26, at 216. For the origination of Lockean moral theory, see
generally JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 44 (Peter Laslett ed.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 1988) (1690).
65. See Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 573 (1977) (articulating
the state's interest in enforcing a right of publicity as "focusing on the right of the
individual to reap the reward of his endeavors"). Critics of this justification often point
out, however, that fame is often unearned. Madow, supra note 57, at 179 ("Plenty of
people become famous nowadays through sheer luck, through involvement in public
scandal, or through criminal or grossly immoral conduct."). Furthermore, critics argue,
even the most successful identities owe their success to factors over which they have no
control or to others who helped them along the way. See id. at 184-95 (detailing how
celebrity images are not the product of labor). However, this argument is neither novel
nor persuasive, as almost all work is constructed on the shoulders of those who came
before. See Emerson v. Davies, 8 F.Cas. 615, 619 (C.C.D. Mass. 1845) (No. 4,436) ("[I]n
literature, in science and in art, there are, and can be, few, if any, things, which, in an
abstract sense, are strictly new and original throughout...."); see also ROBERT BURTON,
THE ANATOMY OF MELANCHOLY 25 (Holbrook Jackson ed., N.Y. Review of Books
2001) (1628) ("A dwarf standing on the shoulders of a Giant may see farther than a Giant
himself; I may likely add, alter, and see farther than my predecessors . . .
66. Haemmerli, supra note 48, at 431.
67. See id. at 390.
68. Id. at 429.
69. Id. at 431.
70. See id. at 418, 420-28 (discussing the philosophical underpinnings of having a
property right in one's persona).
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spirit,"" not to economics, that is at issue. This is perhaps best
summarized in a statement made over a hundred years ago by Justice
Andrew J. Cobb:
The knowledge that one's features and form are being used ...
and displayed in ... advertisements ... brings not only the
person of an extremely sensitive nature, but even the individual
of ordinary sensibility, to a realization that his liberty has been
taken away from him; and, as long as the advertiser uses him for
these purposes, he cannot be otherwise than conscious of the
fact that he is for the time being under the control of another,
that he is no longer free, and that he is in reality a slave, without
hope of freedom, held to service by a merciless master; and ...
no one can be more conscious of his enthrallment than he is.72
The idea that one's identity belongs to oneself is a strong one,
and the thought of someone else having free reign to use one's
likeness without permission makes even the "individual of ordinary
sensibility" uncomfortable." Yet, on the other hand, equally
uncomfortable is the thought of curtailing or censoring the
fundamental right of free speech.
B. First Amendment Concerns
Commentators have articulated many reasons why the right of
publicity should be limited in its application or even abolished.74 The
two most prominent arguments are preemption by federal copyright
law and infringement of the First Amendment. While preemption
arguments have enjoyed some limited success, they have largely been
ineffective in the courts." Rather, it is the First Amendment
arguments that have carried the most weight.76
71. Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Preserving Personality and Reputational Interests of
Constructed Personas Through Moral Rights: A Blueprint for the Twenty-First Century,
2001 U. ILL. L. REv. 151, 166.
72. Pavesich v. New England Life Ins., Co., 50 S.E. 68, 80 (Ga. 1905).
73. Id.
74. See generally, e.g., Rosemary J. Coombe, Author/izing the Celebrity: Publicity
Rights, Postmodern Politics, and Unauthorized Genders, 10 CARDOzO ARTS & ENT. L.J.
365 (1992); Madow, supra note 57; David Tan, Political Recoding of the Contemporary
Celebrity and the First Amendment, 2 HARV. J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 1 (2011); Eugene
Volokh, Freedom of Speech and the Right of Publicity, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 903 (2003).
75. See, e.g., Dryer v. Nat'l Football League, 689 F. Supp. 2d 1113, 1121-22 (D. Minn.
2010) (rejecting preemption of right of publicity claims by federal copyright and
trademark laws); see also MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 11:50, at 845 (stating that the
majority rule is that a state-based right of publicity is not preempted by federal copyright
law); Jennifer E. Rothman, Copyright Preemption and the Right of Publicity, 36 U.C.
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The First Amendment protects freedom of expression and
speechn7 and, as many legal minds have noted, is essential to a
democratic society." Critics argue that, by banning the use of
another's image or likeness, the right of publicity infringes upon the
freedom of speech protected by the First Amendment and is imposed
at the expense of expression and creativity.79 Judge Alex Kozinski of
the Ninth Circuit explains this viewpoint in White v. Samsung
Electronics America.' In White, Vanna White, the Wheel of Fortune
hostess, sued Samsung over a VCR advertisement." Judge Kozinski
dissented from the court's opinion that White's right of publicity had
been violated by arguing that the right of publicity stifles creativity
and is "imposed at the expense of future creators and of the public at
DAVIS L. REV. 199, 225-26 (2002) (noting that few courts have found the right of publicity
to be preempted by copyright law). But cf Ahn v. Midway Mfg. Co., 965 F. Supp. 1134,
1138 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (holding that federal copyright law does preempt a state right of
publicity).
76. See, e.g., C.B.C. Distrib. & Mktg. Inc. v. Major League Baseball Advanced Media,
L.P., 505 F.3d 818, 823-24 (8th Cir. 2007) (holding that while a prima facie right of
publicity claim existed, it was superseded by the First Amendment); Cardtoons, L.C. v.
Major League Baseball Players Ass'n, 95 F.3d 959, 976 (10th Cir. 1996) (holding that First
Amendment concerns trumped the players' right of publicity interests).
77. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
78. Justice Louis Brandeis noted:
Those who won our independence believed that the final end of the state was to
make men free to develop their faculties .... They believed that freedom to think
as you will and to speak as you think are means indispensable to the discovery
and spread of political truth; that without free speech and assembly discussion
would be futile; that with them, discussion affords ordinarily adequate protection
against the dissemination of noxious doctrine; that the greatest menace to
freedom is an inert people, that public discussion is a political duty; and that this
should be a fundamental principle of the American government.
Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927). Furthering Justice Brandeis's analysis on
the topic, Justice Thurgood Marshall noted that the "First Amendment serves not only the
needs of the polity but also those of the human spirit-a spirit that demands self-
expression. Such expression is an integral part of the development of ideas and a sense of
identity. To suppress such expression would be an 'affront to the individual's worth and
dignity.' " Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 427 (1974).
79. See Volokh, supra note 74, at 929 ("But, when applied to expression 'my property'
is another way of saying 'legally forbidden to be another's speech.' "); Zimmerman, supra
note 46, at 53-54 ("Publicity rights, in other words, are a kind of content-based regulation
of speech.").
80. 971 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1992), reh'g denied, 989 F.2d 1512 (9th Cir. 1993).
81. Id. at 1396.
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large ... ."I He then went on to explain, "Nothing today, likely
nothing since we tamed fire, is genuinely new: Culture, like science
and technology, grows by accretion, each new creator building on the
works of those who came before. Overprotection stifles the very
creative force it's supposed to nurture.""
Three years after Kozinski's dissent in White, the Tenth Circuit
applied Kozinski's reasoning in Cardtoons, L. C. v. Major League
Baseball Player's Association.' In Cardtoons, the court was asked to
determine whether cartoon-like trading cards, in parody of then-
popular baseball cards, violated the baseball players' right to
publicity." The court reasoned that because the use of the baseball
players' likenesses was for "social commentary" purposes and not a
"purely commercial" purpose as in White," the cards were worthy of
First Amendment protection as "an important form of entertainment
and social commentary."87 The court explained further:
One of the primary goals of intellectual property law is to
maximize creative expression. The law attempts to achieve this
goal by striking a proper balance between the right of a creator
to the fruits of his labor and the right of future creators to free
expression. Underprotection of intellectual property reduces
the incentive to create; overprotection creates a monopoly over
the raw material of creative expression."
Since then, courts have gone on to hold that the right of publicity
does not apply if the use of a person's identity is sufficiently
newsworthy, transformative, or expressive.8 9 However, these rulings
have done little to ease the tension between the First Amendment
82. White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 989 F.2d 1512,1516 (9th Cir. 1993) (Kozinski,
J., dissenting); see also id. at 1513 ("Overprotecting [the right of publicity] is as harmful as
underprotecting it. Creativity is impossible without a public domain.").
83. Id. at 1513.
84. 95 F.3d 959 (10th Cir. 1996).
85. Id. at 963-64.
86. Id. at 969-70.
87. Id. at 976.
88. Id.
89. See, e.g., ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ'g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 937-38 (6th Cir. 2003)
(holding that the expressive elements of painting of Tiger Woods outweighed any right of
publicity concerns); Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 255 F.3d 1180,1185-86 (9th Cir.
2001) (holding that the First Amendment allows magazines to use celebrities' names and
likeness in feature articles); Comedy III Prod., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 811
(Cal. 2001) (holding that an artist's rendition of the Three Stooges was not sufficiently
"transformative" to outweigh any right of publicity concerns).
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and the right of publicity,90 and courts and states have continued to
struggle with how to balance these competing interests.91
C. The Balancing Act
In response to changing technology and a desire to extend
protection to public as well as private personas, various states began
adopting right of publicity statutes or recognizing the right through
their common law.' The breadth and depth of protection granted by
each state and how it balances the competing interests varies
substantially. 93 By way of comparison, this subpart provides an
overview of how New York, California, Tennessee, and Georgia-the
four states with the longest history of right of publicity claims94 -have
dealt with right of publicity issues and how courts have attempted to
balance the competing interests of the right of publicity and the
protections of the First Amendment.
1. New York
New York courts do not recognize a common law right to
publicity. 95 However, New York's statutory right of publicity
developed out of a common law ruling in the 1902 case, Roberson v.
Rochester Folding Box Co. 96 In that case, the defendant used a private
90. See ETW Corp., 332 F.3d at 931 ("There is an inherent tension between the right
of publicity and the right of freedom of expression under the First Amendment.");
Jeremey T. Maar, Comment, Constitutional Restraints on State Right of Publicity Laws, 44
B.C. L. REV. 863, 871 (2003) ("The right of publicity's restriction on the unauthorized
commercial use of one's identity prohibits certain forms of expression; it therefore
potentially conflicts with the freedom of speech the First Amendment seeks to protect.").
91. Although originally speaking of the right of privacy, Judge Cobb's statement
extends to publicity as well:
The stumbling block which many have encountered in the way of a recognition of
the existence of a right of privacy [publicity] has been that the recognition of such
a right would inevitably tend to curtail the liberty of speech and of the press. The
right to speak and the right of privacy [publicity] have been coexistent. Each is a
natural right, each exists, and each must be recognized and enforced with due
respect for the other.
Pavesich v. New England Life Ins., Co., 50 S.E. 68, 73 (Ga. 1905).
92. See infra Table 1 (providing a complete list of states and their current laws
regarding the right of publicity).
93. See infra Table 1.
94. See infra Table 1.
95. See Stephano v. News Grp. Publ'n, Inc., 474 N.E.2d 580, 584 (N.Y. 1984) (holding
that any "right of publicity" in New York was encompassed under its Civil Rights Privacy
Law).
96. 64 N.E. 442 (N.Y. 1902).
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picture of the plaintiff to produce over 25,000 posters advertising the
defendant's baking flour.' The court held that in the absence of
legislation, the plaintiff did not have a valid cause of action.98 This
decision caused immense public outcry, and within a year, the New
York Legislature passed sections 50 and 51 of the Civil Rights Law
entitled "Right of Privacy."99 While the New York courts have
steadfastly insisted that there is no right of publicity statute in New
York,"oo the protections enumerated in the state's "Right of Privacy"
statute are indistinguishable from those protected under a common
law right of publicity.' 0'
In order to establish a right of privacy claim in New York, a
plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant (1) used the plaintiff's
name, portrait, picture, or voice; (2) for the purposes of advertising or
trade; and (3) did so without the plaintiff's written consent.0 2 The
plaintiff can recover damages for any injuries, and if the defendant
knowingly used the plaintiff's name, portrait, picture, or voice in an
unauthorized manner, the jury can also award "exemplary
damages." 103
In an effort to accommodate the First Amendment interest, the
New York courts have recognized some limitations on their right of
publicity law, including a newsworthiness and public interest
exception,'04 an incidental use exception,' the application of the
97. Id. at 442.
98. Id. at 447-48. The court also noted that "others would have appreciated the
compliment to their beauty implied in the selection of the picture for such purposes ...
Id. at 443.
99. Lerman v. Flynt Distrib. Co., 745 F.2d 123, 129 (2d Cir. 1984); Denis O'Brien, The
Right of Privacy, 2 COLUM. L. REV. 437, 437-38 (1902) (describing the public outrage
following the Roberson decision).
100. See Stephano, 474 N.E.2d at 584 (holding that any "right of publicity" in New
York was encompassed under its Civil Rights Privacy Law).
101. In fact, Haelan Labs., Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir.
1953), the first case to coin the term "right of publicity," was a federal case interpreting
New York law, and the federal courts continued to find a separate right of publicity in
New York until Stephano explicitly rejected the right of publicity in 1984. See Madow,
supra note 57, at 144 n.76, 172.
102. N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 50 (McKinney 2014).
103. Id.
104. See Davis v. High Soc'y Magazine, Inc., 457 N.Y.S.2d 308, 313 (N.Y. App. Div.
1982) ("It has long been recognized that use of a name or picture by the media in
connection with a newsworthy item is protected by the First Amendment.. . .").
105. See Preston v. Martin Bergman Prod., Inc., 765 F. Supp. 116, 119 (S.D.N.Y. 1991)
(finding that the image of a woman shown in the opening scenes of a motion picture was
not actionable because her appearance was incidental).
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statute to commercial uses only,'0 and a requirement that the
reference to the plaintiff be clear and recognizable. 107
2. California
California has both a common law and a statutory right to
publicity. The common law right of publicity was first addressed in
California in Lugosi v. Universal Pictures.'08 In that case, the widow
and son of movie actor Bela Lugosi sued Universal Pictures to
prevent Universal from selling and marketing Count Dracula
products, which had been made popular by Lugosi's portrayals of the
character.o'0 The court found that a right of publicity existed, but that
the right was only descendible and exercisable after Lugosi's death if
the right had been exercised at some point during his life."0 In this
case, it had not, and therefore the claim was denied."'
In response, California's legislature created a statutory right to
publicity that does not require exercising the right during life and
extends seventy years after the death of the person whose likeness is
in question.112 The statutory right provides protection against
"knowing" uses of a person's name, voice, signature, photograph, or
106. See N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 50 (limiting the application of the statute to
"advertising purposes"); see also Arrington v. New York Times Co., 434 N.E.2d 1319,
1321-22 (N.Y. 1982) (holding that the statute only applies to commercial use of an
individual's name or likeness).
107. Negri v. Schering Corp., 333 F. Supp. 101, 103 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
108. 603 P.2d 425 (Cal. 1979).
109. Id. at 426-27.
110. Id. at 430-31.
111. Id.
112. In his dissent to the Lugosi case, Justice Bird remarked, "The weight of authority
holds that an individual need not exercise one's right of publicity 'to protect it from use by
others or to preserve any potential right of one's heirs.' " Id. at 477 (Bird, J., dissenting)
(quoting Price v. Hal Roach Studios, Inc., 400 F. Supp. 836, 846 (S.D.N.Y. 1975)). Bird
also suggested that the right of publicity should be descendible for fifty years after the
death of the individual in question. See id. Just five years later, the California legislature
passed its right of publicity statute and followed Justice Bird's advice, making the right
descendible for fifty years following the death of the person in question. Act of May 25,
1988, ch. 113, sec. 2, § 990(h), 1988 Cal. Stat. 463, 466. This was later amended to seventy
years. See Act of Oct. 10, 1999, ch. 998, sec. 101, § 990(h), 1999 Cal. Stat. 7616, 7618
(codified at CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344.1 (West 2014)). However, to qualify for application of
the posthumous right, the holder of a deceased person's right of publicity must register the
claim with California's Secretary of State. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344.1(f) (West 2014).
Additionally, the rights-holder cannot recover damages for any use that occurs before
registration, id. § 3344.1(f)(1), and to qualify under the statute, the deceased person's right
of publicity must have had "commercial value at the time of his or her death, or because of
his or her death." Id. § 3344.1(h).
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likeness for various commercial purposes.113 However, the simple use
of a person's likeness in connection with a commercial product does
not violate the statute."4 Rather, the use has to be specifically for
"advertising" purposes as defined by the statute.11 s Thus, the statute
imposes a three-step test that requires the following: (1) a "knowing"
use of the plaintiff's identity; (2) use for "advertising" purposes; and
(3) a direct connection between the use and the commercial
purpose."6
Conversely, under California's common law right of publicity a
plaintiff must prove the following: (1) the defendant's appropriation
of plaintiff's "identity" for defendant's advantage; (2) lack of
plaintiff's consent; and (3) resulting injury."' Courts have interpreted
"identity" broadly and the term encompasses more than it does under
the statutory right of publicity."' For example, a picture of a distinctly
decorated racecar where the driver is not visible would not violate the
statute, but it does violate the common law right."' Additionally, the
Ninth Circuit has suggested that under certain circumstances the
common law right is not limited exclusively to commercial uses of the
plaintiff's identity.120
Plaintiffs can bring actions under both the statutory right and the
common law right,'121 and most do.122 However, both the statutory and
the common law rights are subject to various First Amendment
exceptions: under the common law there is an exception for
113. Id. § 3344(a).
114. See id. § 3344(e).
115. Id.
116. See, e.g., Newcombe v. Adolf Coors Co., 157 F.3d 686, 692 (9th Cir. 1998).
117. See White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1397 (9th Cir. 1992).
118. See Waits v. Frito-Lay, 978 F.2d 1093, 1098-1100 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that
imitating someone's voice may violate the common law right); White, 971 F.2d at 1397-99
(holding that a robot designed to look like someone may violate the common law right,
even if it is not sufficiently similar to violate the statute).
119. See Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d 821, 827 (9th Cir.
1947) (holding that a race car driver could have a property interest in his own identity).
120. See Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 255 F.3d 1180, 1186 (9th Cir. 2001)
(holding that under certain circumstances a plaintiff can recover damages for
noncommercial speech if he or she can show that the speaker acted with "actual malice").
121. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344(g) (West 2014).
122. The strategy behind this is that under the statute, the plaintiff, if successful,
receives at minimum $750.00, but can also receive punitive damages, profits attributable to
the unauthorized use, and attorney's fees. See id. § 3344(a). Meanwhile, under the
common law, the plaintiff can simultaneously recover for "injury to peace, happiness, and
feelings." See, e.g., Newcomb v. Adolf Coors Co., 157 F.3d 686, 689 (9th Cir. 1998); Wendt
v. Host Int'l, Inc., 125 F.3d 806, 810-11 (9th Cir. 1997); Waits, 978 F.2d at 1103.
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"expressive works, whether factual or fictional";123 and under the
statutory law there are express exceptions for any use in a "play,
book, magazine, newspaper, musical composition, audiovisual work,
radio or television program, single and original work of art, work of
political or newsworthy value," or an advertisement for any of these
works.124
3. Tennessee
Like California, Tennessee recognizes both a common law right
to publicity and a similar statutory right.125 Like California, Tennessee
also made the right both freely transferable and descendible. 26
However, Tennessee differs from California in that it limits coverage
to a "name, photograph or likeness."127 Also, it does not require
registration by the heirs of the right upon the death of the
individual. 2 ' Rather, it provides that the heirs have the sole right to
use the publicity rights during the first ten years following the death
of the individual.129 Then, following the ten-year period, there is a
grace period of two years in which the estate can still claim the right
by using it. If the heirs claim the right in this period, then the right
permanently belongs to the estate; if not claimed, then it enters the
public domain.'30 Tennessee provides First Amendment exceptions to
its right of publicity for the use of a person's "name, photograph or
likeness . . . in connection with any news, public affairs, or sports
broadcast or account."'31
4. Georgia
Georgia has no statutory right of publicity; however, it has a
well-developed common law right.132 In Martin Luther King, Jr.
123. See Daly v. Viacom, 238 F. Supp. 2d 1118,1123 (N.D. Cal. 2002).
124. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344.1(a)(2) (listing several mediums of entertainment and
stating that they are not to be considered under the statute if they are a "dramatic, literary,
or musical work").
125. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 47-25-1101 to -1108 (2012) (establishing a statutory right);
State ex reL Elvis Presley Int'l Mem'l Found. v. Crowell, 733 S.W.2d 89, 97 (Tenn. Ct.
App. 1987) (recognizing a common law right); see also infra Table 1.
126. TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-25-1103 (2012).
127. Id. § 47-25-1103(a).
128. Id.; see also id. § 47-25-1104 (explaining the conditions of descendibility).
129. Id. § 47-25-1104.
130. Id. § 47-25-1104(b)(2).
131. Id. § 47-25-1107(a).
132. See Martin Luther King, Jr. Cntr. for Soc. Change, Inc. v. Am. Heritage Prod., Inc.
296 S.E.2d 697, 703 (Ga. 1982) ("Therefore, we hold that the appropriation of another's
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Center for Social Change, Inc. v. American Heritage Products, Inc.,13
the Supreme Court of Georgia answered three certified questions
from the Eleventh Circuit regarding the right of publicity in Georgia:
(1) does the right of publicity exist as a right independent of the right
of privacy; (2) does the right survive the death of the owner; and (3)
does the right have to be exploited during life to be descendible?3 In
response, the Georgia court held (1) that the right of publicity was
discrete from the right of privacy; (2) that it was property and was
thus inheritable and devisable; and (3) that the owner of the right did
not have to use it during life for it to survive his death. 135 Georgia's
right of publicity extends only to a person's name and likeness and
only protects against unauthorized uses of a person's identity for
financial gain.136 It currently only provides a First Amendment
exception for "newsworthiness.""3
While each state arrived at separate conclusions about the basic
questions of whether or not the right of publicity should be a property
right, extend beyond death, or be a statutory or common law right,38
these states uniformly recognized the need to balance the right with
the interests of the First Amendment by identifying specific
exemptions.139 However, the range of exclusions, numbering from one
in Georgia to over ten in California,140 indicate the disparity of
name and likeness ... is a tort in Georgia ... whether the person . . . is a private citizen,
entertainer, or as here a public figure who is not a public official.").
133. 296 S.E.2d 697 (Ga. 1982).
134. Id. at 698-99.
135. Id. at 703, 705-06.
136. See id. at 703 ("[T]he appropriation of another's name and likeness, whether such
likeness be a photograph or sculpture, without consent and for financial gain of the
appropriator is a tort in Georgia . . . ").
137. The Georgia Supreme Court has stated: "Where an incident is a matter of public
interest, or the subject matter of a public investigation, a publication in connection
therewith can be a violation of no one's legal right of privacy." Waters v. Fleetwood, 91
S.E.2d 344, 348 (Ga. 1956). Though Waters focuses on the "right of privacy," courts have
expanded the newsworthiness test to right of publicity cases. See, e.g., Toffolini v. LFP
Publ'g Grp., 572 F.3d 1201, 1208 (11th Cir. 2009) ("[W]here a publisher may be precluded
by the right of publicity from publishing one's image for purely financial gain, as in an
advertisement, where the publication is newsworthy, the right of publicity gives way to
freedom of the press.").
138. See supra Part II.C.1-4.
139. See supra Part II.C.1-4.
140. See supra Part II.C.2, Part II.C.4
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thought in deciding how much weight should be given to each right.
This balancing of interests is something that courts have struggled
with as well when interpreting right of publicity laws against the
backdrop of First Amendment rights.
D. How Courts Have Interpreted Right of Publicity Laws While
Balancing First Amendment Concerns
The first time the Supreme Court of the United States examined
the right of publicity was in Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting
Co.1' In Zacchini, the plaintiff's complete "human cannonball"
performance was recorded and subsequently broadcast by a television
station in Ohio.'42 Zacchini brought suit against the television
company alleging a violation of his right of publicity under Ohio
law.'4 3 The Ohio courts ruled in favor of the broadcasting company
and ruled that Zacchini's claim was barred by the First
Amendment." Zacchini appealed and the case went before the
Supreme Court.'45 The Supreme Court noted conflicting interests. On
the one hand, the Court recognized the interest of "protecting the
proprietary interest of the individual" and the individual's ability to
"reap the reward of his endeavors,"'" and on the other hand, the
Court identified the First Amendment guarantees of freedom of
speech and the press.147 Ultimately, the Court ruled in favor of
Zacchini, finding that "[w]herever the line in particular situations is to
be drawn between media reports that are protected and those that are
not, we are quite sure that the First and Fourteenth Amendments do
not immunize the media when they broadcast a performer's entire act
without consent."'4 8 Following Zacchini, in an attempt to define the
"line in particular situations,"'49 lower courts began applying different
balancing tests to resolve conflicts between the right of publicity and
First Amendment protections. The three most common tests are the
Predominant Use Test,5 0 the Rogers Test,"' and the Transformative
Use Test.152
141. 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
142. Id. at 564.
143. Id.
144. See id. at 565-66.
145. See id at 565.
146. Id. at 573.
147. See id. at 574-76.
148. Id. at 574-75.
149. Id.
150. See infra Part II.D.1.
2086 [Vol. 92
2014] PUBLICITY RIGHTS IN NORTH CAROLINA
1. The Predominant Use Test
The Predominant Use Test focuses on the ultimate use of the
identity and was first applied in Doe v. TCI Cablevision."3 TCI
considered the right of publicity claim of Anthony "Tony" Twist, a
hockey player, against the producers of the Spawn comic book series
due to the introduction of a villain into the series by the name of
Anthony "Tony Twist" Twistelli.154 In balancing Twist's property
interests in his name and identity against the First Amendment
interests of the comic book creators, the court rejected the Rogers
and Transformative Use tests and instead employed what it labeled a
"sort of predominant use test":
If a product is being sold that predominantly exploits the
commercial value of an individual's identity, that product
should be held to violate the right of publicity and not be
protected by the First Amendment, even if there is some
"expressive" content in that it might qualify as "speech" in
other circumstances. If, on the other hand, the predominant
purpose of the product is to make an expressive comment on or
about a celebrity, the expressive values could be given greater
weight."
The court then ruled for Twist, holding that "the metaphorical
reference to Twist, though a literary device, has very little literary
value compared to its commercial value.""' Essentially, if the use is
primarily for commercial purposes, then the First Amendment will
not protect the use. However, if the use is primarily to express an
idea, thought, or speech rather than to create economic profit, then
the First Amendment will protect the use.
2. The Rogers Test
Many commentators have suggested that right of publicity claims
are similar to trademark claims because both types of claims require
balancing property interests against the interests of free expression.'
151. See infra Part II.D.2.
152. See infra Part II.D.3.
153. 110 S.W.3d 363 (Mo. 2003) (en banc).
154. Id. at 366-68.
155. Id. (quoting Mark S. Lee, Agents of Chaos: Judicial Confusion in Defining the
Right of Publicity-Free Speech Interface, 23 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 471, 500 (2003)).
156. Id.
157. See ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ'g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 924 (6th Cir. 2003) ("[A]
Lanham Act false endorsement claim is the federal equivalent of the right of publicity."
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As such, courts have at times applied what is called the Rogers Test.
The Rogers Test evolved out of Rogers v. Grimaldi,'" a case that
involved both a right of publicity claim and a claim under the
trademark-specific Lanham Act.159
In Rogers, actress Ginger Rogers brought suit against the maker
of a film titled "Ginger and Fred."1" Rogers asserted a right of
publicity claim, citing the unauthorized use of her name in the title.'6 '
She also asserted a claim under the Lanham Act alleging that the
movie title would confuse consumers.162 The court held that, because
"the title 'Ginger and Fred' is clearly related to the content of the
movie and is not a disguised advertisement for the sale of goods and
services or a collateral commercial product,"'63 the right of publicity
does "not bar the use of a celebrity's name in a movie title unless the
title was 'wholly unrelated' to the movie or was 'simply a disguised
commercial advertisement for the sale of goods or services.' "'" The
test has since expanded beyond movie titles,' but the focus of the
test remains on whether the use of the identity in question is "wholly
unrelated" to the underlying work.
3. The Transformative Use Test
In Comedy III Productions, Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc.,166 the
California Supreme Court considered whether an artist's charcoal
rendering of the Three Stooges, sold on t-shirts and as prints, violated
(citing Bruce P. Keller, The Right of Publicity: Past, Present, and Future, 1207 PLI CORP.
LAW & PRAC. HANDBOOK 159, 170 (2000))). See generally Beckerman-Rodau, supra note
26 (arguing for a limited right of publicity based on trademark law principles); Stacey L.
Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, What the Right of Publicity Can Learn from Trademark Law,
58 STAN. L. REV. 1161 (2006) (analogizing the right of publicity and trademark law).
158. 875 F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 1989).
159. See id. at 997.
160. Although titled "Ginger and Fred," the movie was not actually about Ginger
Rogers or Fred Astaire, but was about two Italian entertainers who imitated Ginger and
Fred. See id. at 996-97.
161. See id. at 997.
162. See id.
163. Id. at 1004-05.
164. Id. at 1005 (citations omitted).
165. See, e.g., Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437, 441, 461 (6th Cir. 2003) (applying
the Rogers Test to a case involving the use of Rosa Park's name in the title of a song
recorded by the rap group OutKast); Matthews v. Wozencraft, 15 F.3d 432, 432, 440 (5th
Cir. 1994) (applying the Rogers Test to a case involving a novel using events from the life
of an undercover narcotics officer).
166. 21 P.3d 797 (Cal. 2001).
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the Three Stooges' right of publicity.'67 The court ruled in favor of the
Three Stooges.'" Importing the first factor of the Fair Use Test
employed in copyright law,16 9 the court defined the Transformative
Use Test as follows:
[T]he central purpose of the inquiry ... "is to see ... whether
the new work merely 'supersede[s] the objects' of the original
creation, or instead adds something new, with a further purpose
or different character, altering the first with new expression,
meaning, or message; it asks, in other words, whether and to
what extent the new work is 'transformative.' "170
Essentially, the focus of the Transformative Use Test is on the
expressive nature of the use. It asks whether the use is creating
something new, thereby "transforming" the original image into a new
expression, as opposed to just copying or reproducing the original.17 '
III. THE NATIONAL TREND
As evidenced above, different states and courts have adopted
various means for dealing with the competing interests of the right of
publicity and the First Amendment.172 However, the national trend is
moving towards adopting a statutory right of publicity that defines the
right as a property right,'73 is limited to commercial activity,174 relies
167. See id. at 799-800.
168. See id. at 811.
169. See id. at 808 (noting that importing the first step of the Fair Use Test made sense
because copyright law and the right of publicity have "a common goal of encouragement
of free expression and creativity ... by protecting the creative fruits of intellectual and
artistic labor").
170. Id. (quoting Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994)).
171. See infra notes 186-88 and accompanying text. The Transformative Use Test was
recently adopted by the Ninth Circuit and applied in In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name
& Likeness Licensing Litig., 724 F.3d 1268 (9th Cir. 2013). In NCAA Student-Athlete, an
NCAA football player brought suit against the makers of the video game NCAA Football
2013 alleging that the creation of an avatar of the plaintiff was a violation of his right of
publicity. See id. at 1271-72. In evaluating the claim, the Ninth Circuit noted that, while
the game as a whole included some changes to the plaintiffs image, such as the ability to
alter some of the avatar's features, the entire purpose of the game was to realistically
portray the plaintiff in the context of college football games. See id. at 1278-79. The court
then concluded that under the Transformative Use Test, because the aim was to reproduce
the plaintiff in realistic fashion and not create something new, "EA's use of the likenesses
of college athletes like Samuel Keller in its video games is not, as a matter of law,
protected by the First Amendment." Id. at 1284.
172. See supra Parts II.C, II.D.
173. Of the thirty-three states that explicitly base the right in privacy or property,
twenty-two base the right in property. See infra notes 409-10 and accompanying text.
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on statutory exemptions,"' and uses the Transformative Use Test' 6 to
preserve First Amendment protections."' This Part highlights some
of the benefits of this trend, such as the transferability and
descendibility that comes with defining the right as property, and also
some of the problems, such as limiting protection only to commercial
activity.
A. The Benefits
Two benefits of defining the right as a property right, rather than
a privacy right, are that the right is both transferable and
descendible." 8 The principal argument in favor of transferability is
grounded in the incentive-based theory."' The argument runs that
"transferability promotes economic creation incentives by allowing
those who hold the right to exploit it to their advantage." 80
Furthermore, transferability in other intellectual property interests
such as copyright, trademark, and patents has helped promote
174. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344(a) (West 2014) ("for purposes of advertising or
selling"); FLA. STAT. § 540.08(1) (2014) ("for purposes of trade or for any commercial or
advertising purpose"); 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. 1075 / 10 (2012) ("for commercial
purposes"); NEV. REV. STAT. § 597.790 (2010) ("[a]ny commercial use").
175. See, e.g., IND. CODE § 32-36-1-1(c) (2012) (granting multiple exemptions); MASS.
ANN. LAWS ch. 214, § 3A (LexisNexis 2011) (noting an exception for professional
photography); NEB. REV. STAT. § 20-202(1)-(3) (2007) (listing various statutory
exemptions); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2741.02(D) (LexisNexis 2012) (listing
exemptions).
176. The Transformative Use Test has now been applied in various jurisdictions. See,
e.g., NCAA Student-Athlete, 724 F.3d at 1284 (applying the Transformative Use Test in the
Ninth Circuit); Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141, 165-66 (3d Cir. 2013) (accepting and
applying the test in the Third Circuit); Winter v. DC Comics, 69 P.3d 473, 476 (Cal. 2003)
(applying the test in a California case).
177. For a survey of how the fifty states have approached the right of publicity, see
infra Tables 1, 2.
178. See Estate of Presley v. Russen, 513 F. Supp. 1339, 1354 (D.N.J. 1981) (noting that
designating the right of publicity as property made it "capable of being disassociated from
the individual and transferred by him for commercial purposes"); see also MCCARTHY,
supra note 1, §§ 1:5-7, at 611. The distinction between privacy and property is important.
Privacy law is concerned primarily with the rights of the individual and is considered a
personal right. See Nimmer, supra note 26, at 209-10. Personal rights are non-transferable
and terminate upon death of the individual. See id. Conversely, property rights are
concerned with pecuniary value; they are not unique to an individual and are freely
assignable and descendible. See id.
179. See supra Part II.A
180. J. Eugene Salomon, Jr., Note, The Right of Publicity Run Riot: The Case for a
Federal Statute, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 1179, 1205 (1987) (highlighting the need for a
transferable right of publicity).
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efficient economic allocation and use."8' Thus, allowing individuals to
freely license or assign their images or "identities" enables the
individual to maximize the economic benefits-benefits that will
ultimately spill over into society at large.182
Similarly, descendibility would also encourage individuals to
invest in themselves in ways that would serve the public interest.1 13 A
descendible publicity right would allow an individual to assure that
the right vests in a "suitable beneficiary."" Such a beneficiary would
be more likely to ensure the image of the decedent was used in a
manner the decedent would have wanted and would prevent it from
being exploited purely for commercial or political gain.' Finally, it
does not seem rational or equitable that upon an individual's death,
advertisers, political pundits, or others should be able to use the
image of the decedent to further their own ends simply because that
individual is no longer alive to assert a privacy right. A mother,
father, or child should be able to prevent the objectionable or
offensive use of the image or likeness of a deceased family member.1 6
Another benefit to the national trend is the use of the
"transformative test" in determining the applicability of First
Amendment protections. While criticized by some for being vague
and uncertain,8 ' the Transformative Use Test strikes the best balance
between providing a flexible yet uniformly applicable framework for
balancing the interests of the First Amendment against those of the
right of publicity. Unlike the Predominant Use Test, the
Transformative Use Test is primarily concerned with the expressive
nature of the product or creation rather than whether the use was
commercial.' Thus, by focusing on the expressive element rather
181. See id. (noting that the value of the right of publicity would likely be greatly
diminished if it was not transferable); see also supra Part II.A (discussing the justifications
for a right of publicity under the tragedy of commons theory).
182. See supra notes 53-57 and accompanying text (discussing the utilitarian theory and
spill-over effect).
183. See supra notes 53-57 and accompanying text.
184. Estate of Presley v. Russen, 513 F. Supp. 1339,1355 (D.N.J. 1981) (quoting Lugosi
v. Universal Pictures, 603 P.2d 425, 446 (Cal. 1979) (Bird, J., dissenting)).
185. For example, Jonathan Faber notes that a descendible right of publicity "ensures
that movie clips of Humphrey Bogart, a heavy smoker who died of cancer, cannot be
featured in tobacco advertisements without his heirs having a say," something which Faber
says Bogart's heirs routinely rejected. See Faber, supra note 10, at 5.
186. See supra notes 66-73 and accompanying text.
187. See, e.g., Volokh, supra note 74, at 916-25 (critiquing the Transformative Use
Test).
188. See supra Part II.D.
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than the predominant use, the Transformative Use Test avoids the
conclusion implicit in the Predominant Use Test that at least some
expressive speech has no First Amendment value.8 9
Likewise, the Transformative Use Test is superior to the Rogers
Test because, unlike the Rogers Test, the Transformative Use Test
maintains its focus on the principal issue-whether the use is an
expression protected by the First Amendment. By focusing on
whether the use is "wholly unrelated" to the underlying work,' 90 the
Rogers Test shifts the analysis away from the expressive nature of the
use and instead focuses on whether the use is related to the protected
material.191 This shift blurs the primary First Amendment concern of
whether the work is expressive speech. In contrast, the core inquiry of
the Transformative Use Test is precisely whether the "new work
merely 'suspercede[s] the objects' of the original creation, or instead
adds ... new expression, meaning, or message."'" Thus, the analysis
under the Transformative Use Test remains on whether the speech is
expressive and therefore deserving of constitutional protection, or
whether it is simply copying someone else's work.
B. The Problems
Although the national trend of defining the right of publicity as a
property interest has its benefits,193 this designation also carries
significant problems. Property ownership creates certain rights in the
owner, one of which is the right to exclude others from using the
property and to invoke the government's authority to uphold such
exclusions." Thus, a property owner may exclude others from using
his property as a means to engage in speech.1 95 This is true even when
189. See Doe v. TCI Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d 363, 374 (Mo. 2003) (en banc) (noting
that First Amendment protection could be denied in some circumstances "even if there is
some 'expressive' content . .. [that] might qualify as 'speech' in other circumstances").
190. Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 1005 (2d Cir. 1989) (citation omitted) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
191. See supra Part II.D (describing the "wholly unrelated" analysis under the Rogers
Test).
192. Comedy III Prods. Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 808 (Cal. 2001)
(quoting Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994)).
193. See supra Part III.A (discussing the positive social repercussions of having a
transferable and descendible right of publicity).
194. See Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979) ("[O]ne of the most
essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as property [is] the
right to exclude others.").
195. See, e.g., Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 485 (1988) (holding that "[t]here is simply
no right to force speech into the home of an unwilling listener," that "we have repeatedly
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excluding use may prevent the most effective means of expressing
one's message. For example, while "[a]n espousal of socialism may
carry different implications when displayed on the grounds of a
stately mansion than when pasted on a factory wall,"196 the Supreme
Court has held that speakers only have a right to adequate means of
communication, not the most effective means.1 97 Similarly, while a
postcard of John Wayne wearing lipstick may be a powerful message,
a property-based right of publicity would extinguish that message if
the owner of the right chose to prohibit that use.198 Such a line of
reasoning would be equally applicable to the famous Andy Warhol
paintings,199 political cartoons, and any other medium that used a
person's likeness for purposes of speech or expression. Ultimately, a
property-based right of publicity would completely swallow any
expression, parody, or social commentary that used another's image
or likeness.
Another problem with the national trend is limiting the right to
only commercial uses. Such a limitation may have been practical in
the past, as the cost of obtaining and reproducing an individual's
likeness for noncommercial use would have been prohibitive.
However, with modern technological advances, capturing and widely
disseminating someone's likeness can be accomplished from a
smartphone or similar device with no additional cost beyond
acquiring the device and a data connection. This ease of obtaining
held that individuals are not required to welcome unwanted speech into their own homes,"
and that "the government may protect this freedom"); Lloyd Corp., Ltd. v. Tanner, 407
U.S. 551, 568-69 (1972) ("[T]his Court has never held that a trespasser or an uninvited
guest may exercise general rights of free speech [using] property privately owned and used
nondiscriminatorily for private purposes only .... [P]roperty [does not] lose its private
character merely because the public is generally invited to use it for designated
purposes.").
196. City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 56-57 (1994).
197. See Members of City Council of L.A. v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 812
(1984) (holding that there is no right to a specific means of communication if "there are
ample alternative modes of communication"); Lloyd, 407 U.S. at 567 (1972) (noting that
only "adequate alternative avenues of communication" must be available); see also Frisby,
487 U.S. at 486, 488 (upholding a ban on picketing an individual house "even if some such
picketers have a broader communicative purpose").
198. Madow, supra note 57, at 144-45.
199. Andy Warhol was a famous American artist widely known for his "pop art"
paintings. See Andy Warhol: A Documentary Film, PBS (Sept. 20, 2006),
http://www.pbs.org/wnetlamericanmasters/episodes/andy-warholla-documentary-fihnl/44/.
His paintings included many of famous celebrities. See id. The most famous of these is
likely the "Marilyn Diptych" in which Warhol painted Marilyn Monroe. See id. Under a
strictly property right jurisprudence, Warhol's use of Marilyn's image would not be
protected as Marilyn's heirs would have the right to exclude him from using her likeness.
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and disseminating an individual's likeness has led to unauthorized
uses for an increasing array of purposes outside the scope of
commercial uses, such as extracting revenge2O or cyberbullying.201
Such uses are as equally unauthorized as commercial ones, often have
no describable expressive element, and often are not adequately
covered under applicable state privacy law.2 02
Ultimately, the national trend is steadily moving towards a
descendible and transferable property-based right that requires
commercial use of one's image before triggering protection. However,
by basing the right of publicity in property law, this movement
threatens to swallow any First Amendment claims, and by limiting
protection only to commercial uses, it leaves citizens vulnerable to
uses of their likeness that strike at a person's dignity rather than their
pocketbook.
IV. NORTH CAROLINA LAw, PRIVACY, AND PUBLICITY
A. North Carolina Privacy Law
In contrast to the national trend, North Carolina currently does
not explicitly recognize a right to publicity; however, it does recognize
a limited misappropriation action under its privacy common law.203
Nevertheless, the breadth and depth of the protection is currently
uncertain, as the Supreme Court of North Carolina has only
addressed the issue of misappropriation once, in 1938.
200. See Amaka Ubaka, UCF Student Accused in 'Revenge Porn' Case,
CLICKORLANDO (Feb. 7, 2014), http://www.clickorlando.com/news/ucf-student-accused-
in-revenge-porn-case/-/1637132/24361886/-/14qOyd2/-/index.html?utmmedium=twitter&
utm_source=twitterfeed (detailing how a University of Central Florida student posted
nude pictures of his ex-girlfriend as revenge for talking to the police about his involvement
with another case).
201. See David Boroff, Texas Parents to Sue Six Cyberbullies for Allegedly Harassing
their Teen Daughter on Instagram, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, (Jan. 27, 2014),
http://www.nydailynews.comlnews/national/texas-parents-sue-cyberbullies-instagram-post-
article-1.1592841 (reporting a case of cyberbullying involving the use of a young teen's
photo); see also Chris Taylor, 'Star Wars Kid' Blasts Bullies, Jedi Knights Defend Him,
MASHABLE (May 10, 2013), http://mashable.com/2013/05/10/star-wars-kid-interview-
cyberbullying/ (describing the bullying of a fifteen year old boy whose lightsaber video was
posted online by his classmates, subjecting him to harassment and humiliation, including
comments suggesting he commit suicide).
202. See infra Part IV.B for a discussion about why privacy law is often ill-suited to
protect against these uses.
203. See infra Table 1.
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The 1938 case, Flake v. Greensboro News Co.,'" involved the
unauthorized publication of a photo of Nancy Flake, a widely known
orchestra singer, in an advertisement for the "Folies de Paree," a
group that Flake described as "a theatrical troupe organized in the
city of Chicago and composed of the cheapest class of chorus girls."205
The advertisement was jointly sponsored by the North Carolina
Theaters and Melts Bakery, and featured a photo of Flake in a
bathing suit accompanied by the words "Keep that Sylph-Like
Figure206 by eating more of Melts Rye and Whole Wheat Bread, says
Mlle. Sally Payne, exotic red haired Venus."2" The newspaper had
mistakenly used the photo of Flake instead of a photo of Sally Payne,
who was a member of the Folies.208 Flake brought suit alleging that
the publication of the photo in the advertisement was libelous and
violated her right of privacy.2 The Supreme Court of North Carolina
dismissed her libel claim,210 but held that she had a valid cause of
action for the unauthorized publication of her image.2 1'
Later, in Barr v. Southern Bell Telephone and Telegraph Co.,212
the North Carolina Court of Appeals extended application of the
privacy action of misappropriation to cases where consent was
granted to use a person's name and image, but the use exceeded the
scope of consent.213 In Barr, an employee gave consent for his name
and photograph to be used in a Yellow Pages advertisement for his
employer's rug cleaning business.214 However, the telephone company
then published the ad using the employee's name but substituting the
employee's picture with that of a "much older" man.215 The court of
appeals found that such evidence "would justify" a finding that the
204. 212 N.C. 780, 195 S.E. 55 (1938).
205. Id. at 783, 195 S.E. at 58.
206. A sylph is an imaginary spirit of the air. THE OXFORD AMERICAN COLLEGE
DICTIONARY 1400 (2002). The term "sylphlike" is an adjective for a woman or girl
meaning "slender and graceful." Id.
207. Flake, 212 N.C. at 782, 195 S.E. at 58.
208. See id. at 783, 195 S.E. at 58.
209. See id. at 785, 195 S.E. at 59.
210. See id. at 790, 195 S.E. at 62.
211. Id. at 793, 195 S.E. at 64 ("If ... the name of a person is a valuable asset in
connection with an advertising enterprise, then it must likewise be conceded that his face
or features are likewise of value. Neither can be used without the consent of the owner
without giving rise to a cause of action.").
212. 13 N.C. App. 388, 185 S.E.2d 714 (1972).
213. See id. at 393, 185 S.E.2d at 717.
214. See id. at 388, 185 S.E.2d at 715.
215. Id. at 388, 391, 185 S.E. 2d at 715-16.
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company had violated Barr's rights and remanded the case to the trial
court.216
These two cases, Flake and Barr, encompass the entirety of
North Carolina's current right of publicity and misappropriation
jurisprudence. Under current North Carolina law, to establish a case
for the unauthorized use or misappropriation of an individual's
image, the plaintiff must establish that the defendant used the
plaintiff's likeness without consent and that the use was for an
advertisement. 217 In today's hyper-connected world where anyone can
become a celebrity overnight,2 18 such limited and basic protection is
simply not enough. Not only does it fail to protect plaintiffs in cases
involving purely noncommercial activity such as cyberbullying or
revenge, but it also fails to provide protection for any commercial use
outside of advertising. Thus, someone could lift an image of a local
fallen military hero off the Internet, place it on a t-shirt or coffee mug,
and then, as long as they did not advertise with it, they could go about
selling the merchandise, and the hero's family would be without
recourse to stop it.
B. Problems with North Carolina's Current Privacy Law and Why a
Publicity Right Would Better Serve its Citizens
In today's connected world of social media, there are many
drawbacks to relying on privacy common law to address the issues
surrounding the unauthorized use of one's identity. For instance,
people are less private than in the past, routinely publishing photos,
thoughts, and images of themselves on the Internet.2 19 Such actions
make it difficult to claim that their privacy has been violated by the
use of such an image. On the other hand, posting a photo of oneself
on a blog or social media site should not give license to whatever
third party comes along to appropriate it for personal use.220
216. Id. at 393, 185 S.E.2d at 717.
217. See Flake v. Greensboro News Co., 212 N.C. 780, 792-93, 195 S.E. 55, 64 (1938).
218. See supra notes 3-6 and accompanying text.
219. As of October of 2013, Facebook had over one billion active users and Google+
had 540 million users. See Alistair Barr, Google's Social Network Sees 58% Jump in Users,
USA TODAY (Oct. 29, 2013), http://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/2013/10/29/google-
plus/3296017/. Google was also uploading roughly 1.5 billion photos per week. Id. Even if
users of these sites have privacy settings set at the strictest level, at a minimum the site still
displays a main "profile picture" that is viewable, can be copied, and is thus usable by the
public at large.
220. This is true of copyright law. See MARGARET C. JASPER, THE LAW OF
COPYRIGHT 22-23 (2d ed., 2002). Just because an author or photographer publishes his
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Another shortcoming of pursuing an action under a privacy tort
theory is that the plaintiff must generally demonstrate that the
defendant's unauthorized use of the plaintiff's likeness caused "some
damage to plaintiff's peace of mind and dignity, with resulting injury
measured by mental or physical distress and related damage."221 As
mentioned above, this would be difficult for the person who made her
image publicly available in the first place. However, even for the
more private person, the prospect of having to publicly prove damage
to her dignity and "mental distress" would likely deter her from
seeking redress in court.222
The advent of modern technology creates yet another problem.
In today's world it is rather simple and inexpensive to create a
"perpetual" identity-one that exists beyond death.223 Additionally,
recent advances in digital and holographic technology have made it
possible to recreate deceased personalities and use them for
marketing, entertainment, or other purposes.224 Under existing
privacy law, the descendants of such personalities would not have
standing to pursue a claim in court against the use of the decedent's
image because privacy rights are personal and expire upon death.225
work on the Internet does not mean that it suddenly becomes public domain or that he
gives up his copyright. See id. at 22-23, 30.
221. MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 5:62, at 539.
222. Thomas McCarthy notes that forcing individuals to "conjure up evidence of nasty
jokes by acquaintances and shock to the nervous system to prove indignity and psychic
harm" deters many individuals from pursing privacy actions in "the legal system because
of the forced disclosure in court of embarrassing personal affairs which often have little to
do with the real nature of the grievance." Id. § 4:18, at 226.
223. Examples of such perpetual identities can be found in social media site profiles,
blogs, and other online content that was created by persons who are now deceased. Some
reports estimate that there are over 30 million Facebook accounts of deceased individuals.
See Jaweed Kaleem, Death on Facebook Now Common as 'Dead Profiles' Create a Vast
Virtual Cemetery, HUFFINGTON POST, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/12/07/death-
facebook-dead-profilesn_2245397.html (last updated Jan. 16, 2013).
224. The rapper Tupac Shakur has been dead for more than fifteen years, but, thanks
to recent advances in technology, programmers re-created a live performance of the artist
at the Coachella Valley Music and Arts Festival in 2012 using a hologram. See Jacob Ganz,
How That Tupac Hologram at Coachella Worked, NPR THE RECORD (Apr. 17, 2012)
http://www.npr.org/blogs/therecord/2012/04/17/150820261/how-that-tupac-hologram-at-
coachella-worked. A digital Marilyn Monroe is also being considered and is the subject of
a recent legal debate. See Eriq Gardner, Marilyn Monroe Estate Threatens Legal Action
Over Hologram, THE HOLLYWOOD REPORTER (June 11, 2012), http://www.hollywood
reporter.com/thr-esq/marilyn-monroe-estate-hologram-legal-334817. In 2006, Audrey
Hepburn, who died in 1993, did a commercial for GAP. See Audrey Hepburn "Back in
Black," YOUTUBE http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rNesal2IL-o (last updated Nov. 17,
2009).
225. See MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 9:1, at 418-19.
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Thus, an individual surfing the web who receives a targeted toilet
paper ad featuring a deceased relative would have no standing to
prevent that company's use of the ad.
Finally, North Carolina only recognizes the privacy torts of
appropriation and intrusion, explicitly rejecting publication of private
facts and false light.226 Thus, if someone makes a private photo or
video with the individual's consent but then publishes it on the
Internet for a noncommercial use, the victim would have no recourse
to have it removed.227 There would be no defamation claim as the
image would be truthful.228 The privacy tort of appropriation would
fail because it requires commercial use,2 29 and an intrusion claim
would fail because the image was taken with consent.23 0 This
shortcoming leaves North Carolinians exposed to exploitation,
226. Most states recognize four types of privacy torts: (1) Intrusion, which concerns the
unauthorized intrusion upon the plaintiff's seclusion, solitude, or private affairs that would
be highly offensive to a reasonable person; (2) Publication of private facts, which allows a
cause of action for the publication of private facts without consent that would be highly
offensive to a reasonable person; (3) False Light, which allows for a cause of action when a
publication places the plaintiff in a false light that is highly offensive to a reasonable
person; and (4) Appropriation, which protects against the unauthorized use of a plaintiff's
image for commercial purposes which causes injury to dignity and self-esteem. See id.
§§ 1:19-23, at 31-42. The Supreme Court of North Carolina has rejected the private facts
tort, Hall v. Salisbury Post, 323 N.C. 259, 269-70, 372 S.E.2d 711, 717 (1988), and the false
light tort, Renwick v. News & Observer Publ'g Co., 310 N.C. 312, 326, 312 S.E.2d 405,
413-14 (1984).
227. This is increasingly problematic due to the recent rise in revenge porn and cyber
bullying. See Lizette Alvarez, Girl's Suicide Points to Rise in Apps Used by Cyberbullies,
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 13, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/14/us/suicide-of-girl-after-
bullying-raises-worries-on-web-sites.html?pagewanted=all (discussing the rise of apps that
allow cyberbullies to harass victims through photos and text); Alex Cochrane, The Perils
of "Revenge Porn," THE INT'L FORUM FOR RESPONSIBLE MEDIA BLOG (June 10, 2013),
http://inforrm.wordpress.com/2013/10/06/the-perils-of-revenge-porn-alex-cochrane/
(discussing the recent rise in revenge porn).
228. Defamation requires that the "statement" be false. See White v. Town of Chapel
Hill, 899 F. Supp. 1428, 1438 (M.D.N.C. 1995) (citing West v. King's Dep't Store, Inc., 321
N.C. 698, 703, 365 S.E.2d 621, 624 (1988)) (listing falsity as an element of defamation); see
also Parker v. Edwards, 222 N.C. 75, 78, 21 S.E.2d 876, 878 (1942) (citing Snow v. Witcher,
31 N.C. (9 Ired.) 346 (1849)) (noting that truth is a complete defense).
229. See Flake v. Greensboro News Co., 212 N.C. 780, 792-93, 195 S.E. 55, 64 (1938)
(requiring use to be for an advertisement).
230. See Broughton v. McClatchy Newspapers, Inc., 161 N.C. App. 20, 27, 588 S.E.2d
20, 27 (2003) (requiring the intrusion to be "unauthorized"); Hall v. Post, 85 N.C. App.
610, 615, 355 S.E.2d 819, 823-24 (1987) (noting that intrusion requires information to be
"wrongfully obtained"), rev'd on other grounds, Hall v. Post 323 N.C. 259, 372 S.E.2d 711
(1988); see also Reeves v. Fox Television Network, 983 F. Supp. 703, 712 (N.D. Ohio 1997)
(noting that consent is an absolute defense to intrusion).
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humiliation, and mental anguish when their unauthorized private
images appear on the Internet.
Adopting a statutory right of publicity in North Carolina would
largely solve the problems listed above. For example, unlike a privacy
action, a right of publicity claim does not require the showing of
mental or emotional damage. Thus, a victim of a revenge posting
would be free to pursue legal action under the right of publicity
without having to endure the humiliating and often demeaning
process of proving mental or emotional damage in open court.
Additionally, by granting a right of publicity that is transferable and
descendible, children would have standing to prevent the exploitation
of their deceased parents' identities and images. This would help
eliminate the undesirable prospect of being barraged with targeted
ads featuring deceased relatives hawking various products. Finally,
granting a statutory right that protects against any unauthorized use
of someone's identity, and not just commercial ones, would fill the
gap North Carolina's current privacy law creates regarding online
bullying, harassment, and the unauthorized dissemination of privately
created photos and images.
C. North Carolina's Failed 2009 Right to Publicity Bill
Adopting a statutory right of publicity in North Carolina is not a
new idea. In 2009, in response to concerns of the NASCAR
community and family of military personnel,23' the North Carolina
General Assembly considered a statutory right of publicity.23 2 Under
the proposed statute, any person would have a statutory property
interest in his "personality," defined to include any attribute that
serves to identify a person to "an ordinary reasonable viewer or
listener, including the [person's] name, voice, signature, photograph,
image, portrait, likeness, or distinctive appearance." 233 This right
would have been violated when anyone "knowingly used another
individual's personality for commercial purposes without obtaining
prior consent." 234 The right would have been freely transferable and
descendible (descendibility was limited to seventy years) and would
have provided for use in the following exceptions:
231. Rick Conner & Corby Anderson, Right of Publicity Statute Considered in North
Carolina, SPORTS AND ENTERTAINMENT (McGuireWoods, Richmond, Va.), June 2009, at
7, 10.
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A play, book, magazine, newspaper, musical composition, radio
or television program, single and original work of art, work of
political or newsworthy value, audiovisual work other than a
video game, or an advertisement or commercial announcement
for any of these works, if it is fictional or nonfictional
entertainment, or a dramatic, literary, or musical work. Any
news, public affairs, or sports broadcast or account.235
It also included a provision stating that any person who violated
the statute would be liable for the greater of either one thousand
dollars or any provable profit resulting from the unauthorized use,236
and included provisions for attorney's fees and punitive damages.237
The bill did not pass,238 and while it contained many redeeming
qualities, there were various problems as well.239 Borrowing heavily
from California's statutory law and following the national trend, the
bill codified the right of publicity as a property interest.240 A property
designation provides the positive traits of transferability and
descendibility, but is also problematic because it largely dismisses
First Amendment concerns.24 1 Similarly, following the national trend,
the bill only applied to commercial uses,242 which is problematic
because such a provision leaves citizens vulnerable to harmful
noncommercial uses like revenge and bullying. The bill also included
a long list of exclusions that would have diluted the effectiveness of
establishing the right in the first place243 and required registration by
anyone claiming ownership of a right of a deceased individual.2" This
is problematic not only because it would cost North Carolina a
235. Id. §H 41B-5(b)(1)-(2), 41B-6.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. The bill passed its first reading in the House but died in committee. See House Bill
327, N.C. GEN. ASSEMBLY, http://www.ncleg.net/gascripts/BillLookUplBillLookUp.pl?
Session=2009&BilllD=H327 (last visited May 4, 2014).
239. At least one commentator thought it was a good thing the bill did not pass, stating
that the bill actually weakened the right of publicity rather than providing meaningful
protection. See Faber, supra note 10, at 4, 6.
240. Compare H.B. 327, 2009-2010 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2009) (defining the
publicity right as a property right), with CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344.1(b) (West 2014)
(defining the publicity right as a property right).
241. See infra Part III.B (discussing the problems of a property-based right of
publicity).
242. H.B. 327, 2009-2010 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2009); see also CAL. CIV.
CODE § 3344.1(a)(1) (explaining the scope of the law in commercial contexts only).
243. H.B. 327, 2009-2010 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2009).
244. Id.
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substantial amount of money,245 but also because it requires
affirmative action before extending coverage. Moreover, it is unlikely
that a person would think to register until an unauthorized use
occurred, but by then, it would be too late, as such use would be
exempted.246
D. Recommendations for North Carolina
Instead of adopting a statute like the one proposed in 2009 or an
"undiluted" statute as recently championed by Faber, North Carolina
would be better served by adopting a statute that adequately balances
the significant interest that North Carolinians have in protecting their
image with the traditional interests of the First Amendment. In order
to achieve this goal, North Carolina should follow New York's lead
and adopt a statute that is limited in scope and based in privacy, not
property.247 Unlike New York, however, North Carolina should
incorporate a provision for transferability and descendibility and
extend protection to both commercial and noncommercial uses.
1. Privacy over Property
Although the national trend favors treating the right of publicity
as a property right rather than a privacy right,248 North Carolina
would be better served by basing its right to publicity in privacy
because any recognition of a property right would immediately attach
a "bundle of rights."2 49 This attachment of property rights would
largely squash any First Amendment rights because, as discussed
earlier, property rights include the right to exclude others from use.250
Thus, there would be no balancing against First Amendment interests
245. See N.C. Gen. Assemb., Legis. Fiscal Note, H.B. 327, Sess. 2009 (estimating that it
would cost the state $45,050 to set up a registration system that would only bring in about
$15 a year in registration fees).
246. See H.B. 327, 2009-2010 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2009) (providing an
exception for use where the right was not registered "until such time as a claim of right has
been registered"). This means that unless a person has the foresight to register their claim
to the right, it is likely that the first use of the individual's likeness will be exempted
because the individual will not have registered yet.
247. See N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50-51 (McKinney 2014).
248. See infra Table 2 (providing national totals for categories in Table 1); see also infra
Table 1 (detailing individual states).
249. See supra notes 192-97 and accompanying text (describing the proverbial bundle
of property rights and its effects on the right of publicity); see, e.g., United States v. Craft,
535 U.S. 274, 278 (2002) (describing property as a "bundle of sticks"-a "collection of
individual rights which, in certain combinations, constitute property").
250. See supra notes 192-97 and accompanying text.
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and no weighing of whether a particular use contributed to the public
sphere or was meaningful "social commentary." 25 1 Rather, the
property right of publicity would trump free speech and expression
every time. 2 Such a model would not only severely handicap free
speech and expression, but it would also be cumbersome. The
legislature would be tasked with attempting to conceive of every
exception worthy of protection in its original drafting, and when
technology advances or when other circumstances arise, courts would
be faced with either only allowing those specific exceptions or
creating new ones.253
In contrast, basing a right of publicity in privacy would avoid the
problem of the attachment of the proverbial "bundle of rights" and
allow for the flexibility needed in addressing emerging technologies
and changing circumstances. Additionally, where property rights have
traditionally trumped First Amendment concerns, privacy rights,
since their inception, have been balanced against First Amendment
interests.254 Furthermore, the right of publicity was conceived out of
251. See Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Player's Ass'n, 95 F.3d 959, 970-76
(10th Cir. 1996) (recognizing "social commentary" as worthy of First Amendment
protection over a right of publicity claim).
252. See supra notes 192-97 and accompanying text. The only exceptions are those
explicitly recognized by statute or case law.
253. Such is the case in California, which has a long list of statutory exemptions but has
routinely created additional exceptions in its case law to the point of creating the
Transformative Use Test specifically for the purpose of dealing with exceptions outside
the statutory list. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344.1(a)(2) (West 2014) (listing the statutory
exceptions); Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 808 (Cal. 2001)
(quoting Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994)) (creating the
Transformative Use Test for works that are outside the statutory exemptions).
254. In the first case to recognize a right to privacy, the Georgia Supreme Court
recognized the inherent tension between the First Amendment and privacy rights. See
Pavesich v. New England Life Ins., Co., 50 S.E. 68, 73 (Ga. 1905) ("The stumbling block
which many have encountered in the way of a recognition of the existence of a right of
privacy has been that the recognition of such a right would inevitably tend to curtail the
liberty of speech and of the press."). Courts have recognized this inherent tension and
balancing ever since. See, e.g., Florida Star v. B.J.F, 491 U.S. 524, 529 (1989) (noting the
tension between the right of privacy and the First Amendment); Cox Broad. Corp. v.
Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 489 (1975) (noting that privacy claims often "directly confront" the
First Amendment and that the "face-off" between the two is apparent); ETW Corp. v.
Jireh Pub'g Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 931 (6th Cir. 2003) ("There is an inherent tension between
the right of publicity and the right of freedom of expression under
the First Amendment."). For scholarship addressing this conflict, see, for example,
Edward J. Bloustein, Privacy, Tort Law, and the Constitution: Is Warren and Brandeis's
Tort Petty and Unconstitutional as Well?, 46 TEx. L. REV. 611 (1968); Paul
Gewirtz, Privacy and Speech, 2001 SUP. CF. REV. 139 (2001); Neil M. Richards, The
Puzzle of Brandeis, Privacy, and Speech, 63 VAND. L. REV. 1295 (2010).
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privacy,255 and thus, it makes sense that a right of publicity statute
should be based in privacy-not property-rights.
2. Descendibility and Transferability
While some states, like New York, still refuse to recognize a
post-mortem right of publicity,256 more and more states are extending
protection after death.257 The need for a descendible and transferable
right of publicity only increases as technology continues to provide
ways to re-create the past in stunningly lifelike renditions.58 Here,
North Carolina would do well to keep with the national trend,25 9 and
include a provision in its right of publicity statute to allow for
descendibility and transferability. Such a provision would allow the
right to be freely assignable during life and descendible upon death.
Providing transferability during life allows those interested in the
commercialization of their images to do so freely. Descendibility
upon death would serve two purposes. First, if the decedent's likeness
did have commercial value, then it would ensure that the decedent's
descendants or assignees received its benefit. Second, descendibility
would ensure that those closest to the decedent had the legal means
to protect the decedent's images.26
However, here again, the pecuniary and privacy interests
protected by a descendible and transferable right of publicity should
be balanced with the interests of free speech and expression to
preserve a rich public domain upon which future artists and creators
can draw.261 Thus, like most other states that provide post-mortem
rights, North Carolina should limit the protection to a specific length
of time, after which the right would expire and become part of the
public domain. Here, states vary dramatically, with Tennessee
providing a minimum of ten years of protection2 62 and Indiana
255. See supra Part I.A.
256. See infra Table 1, "New York."
257. See infra Table 1.
258. See supra notes 221-24 and accompanying text. No one wants to face the prospect
of their mother hawking toilet paper to them ten years after she passed away.
259. See supra notes 177-84 and accompanying text.
260. For example, if a military member dies while in service, the deceased's family
should have the right to prevent the use of that soldier's image for commercial and
noncommercial purposes.
261. See, e.g., White v. Samsung Elecs. Am, Inc., 989 F.2d 1512, 1513 (9th Cir. 1993)
(Kozinski, J., dissenting) ("Overprotecting [the right of publicity] is as harmful as
underprotecting it. Creativity is impossible without a rich public domain.").
262. See supra notes 129-30 and accompanying text.
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providing an entire century of exclusive use.263 Providing protection
for only ten years is too short of a time. The Internet retains images
for almost an indefinite period of time and limiting protection to only
a decade leaves many of those closest to the deceased without
recourse before even a generation has passed. Furthermore, the
pecuniary interest in a right of publicity generally increases over time
and a limit of ten years would cut short the economic value of those
interests. 26 However, Indiana's approach of a hundred years of
protection is too long. Such a long term of protection would stifle
creativity and weaken the public domain.265 Rather, providing
protection for fifty years following the death of a person seems more
in line with the aims of the right of publicity. Such an approach would
safeguard both the commercial and privacy interests of the decedent's
immediate family for a reasonable amount of time,26 but not unduly
starve the public domain.267
3. Commercial vs. Noncommercial Use
No state has currently enacted a statute that extends right of
publicity protection to noncommercial uses.26 This is likely due to the
fact that, historically, the right of publicity has been viewed as a
celebrity right, useful only to those who are famous enough to have
their image published in multiple places. 269 Furthermore, until
recently, many commentators thought that the right of privacy was
sufficient to protect non-famous citizens.270 Yet, privacy actions fail to
263. IND. CODE ANN. § 32-36-1-8(a) (LexisNexis 2012).
264. For example, Elvis Presley was worth $250 million in 2003 as opposed to the $10
million he was worth at this death. See Alanna Nash, Elvis at 69: Richer than Ever,
BANKRATE (Jan. 8, 2003), http://www.bankrate.com/brmlnews/advice/20040108al.asp.
265. See supra notes 81-83 and accompanying text (explaining the dangers of
overprotecting the right of publicity).
266. Fifty years would encompass an entire generation, thus those closest to the person
in question would still have recourse.
267. See supra notes 81-83 and accompanying text.
268. To the author's knowledge, no state has explicitly recognized protection for
noncommercial uses. But cf. Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 255 F.3d 1180, 1186-87
(9th Cir. 2001) (indicating that, under certain circumstances, a plaintiff could potentially
recover under the common law for noncommercial uses).
269. See supra note 2 and accompanying text. But cf supra notes 3-6 and
accompanying text (describing how technology has changed the definition of who is a
celebrity).
270. See, e.g., Nimmer, supra note 26, at 203-04 (noting how privacy law protects the
ordinary person whereas the famous personality, who is interested in pecuniary gain, seeks
only monetary compensation for the use of his likeness rather than simply privacy).
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adequately protect the non-famous citizen for a variety of reasons.
Chief among those reasons is that people are becoming less and less
private in the traditional sense.272 It is not difficult to imagine a
scenario in which a Facebook user (or other social media site user)
uploads a photo of themselves or their friends only to have that image
downloaded or copied by a third party and used to harass, embarrass,
or humiliate the individual pictured.273 Under North Carolina's
current privacy law, the victim would have little or no recourse. 274 Just
because the way people share and communicate with each other is
evolving does not mean people are any less deserving of control over
how their image is used.275
Additionally, as technology advances, new types of harms
emerge. Recent years have seen a surge in cyberbullying and revenge-
oriented online publication. 276  Extending protection to
noncommercial uses would provide victims of these emerging harms
with a straightforward way to seek recovery. Moreover, extending
protection to cover such ill-willed uses would deter would-be
perpetrators in the first instance, thereby reducing the overall rate of
occurrence and preventing the harm before it occurs. No one should
have to suffer the indignity of having her likeness misused by
malignant perpetrators-regardless of whether the likeness has
commercial value or not.
4. Putting it all Together
Creating a statute as described above need not be complicated.277
It should simply state that an action may be brought for knowingly
using an individual's name, portrait, photograph, or voice without
authorization;278 include a definition of photograph that requires the
plaintiff to be readily identifiable and includes videography;279 add a
271. See supra Part IV.B.
272. See supra notes 3-6, 217-18 and accompanying text.
273. For example, pictures of high school girls were recently taken from their
Facebook pages and uploaded to a site where the user was asked to vote whether or not
they would have sex with the pictured girl. See Offensive Website Targets High School
Girls, OURWINDSOR.CA, http://www.ourwindsor.calnews-story/4448517-offensive-website
-targets-high-school-girls/ (last visited May 4, 2014).
274. See supra notes 225-29 and accompanying text.
275. See supra note 219 and accompanying text.
276. See supra notes 198-200.
277. See infra Appendix A for author's suggested sample statute.
278. See N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 51 (McKinney 2014) (including protection for
"name, portrait, picture or voice").
279. See H.B. 327, § 41B-2(4), 2009-2010 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2009).
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provision that allows the action to be brought for a period of fifty
years following the death of an individual by the individual's
designated beneficiary or takers at law having at least a 50% interest
in the deceased's estate;20 omit any registration requirement;281 and
provide damages in the greater of one thousand dollars or actual
damages with special provision for punitive damages and reasonable
attorneys' fees.21 Finally, the statute should include a list of
exemptions that includes use for any original "transformative"
creation,2 incidental use,2' or any news, public interest, or sports
broadcast or account.285
Such a statute would grant North Carolinians legal protection for
their identity in a meaningful way without overtly intruding on the
rights guaranteed by the First Amendment. Allowing an action to be
brought for fifty years following the death of an individual, but
without creating a property interest in the right, will still protect the
pecuniary and privacy interests of the individual and his descendants
but will avoid sidelining the First Amendment. By allowing
exemptions for "transformative," incidental, or newsworthy uses, but
not requiring the use to be for commercial purposes, the statute
would provide protection for instances of noncommercially motivated
uses such as revenge, malice, or similar motives, but still protect
legitimate uses such as parody, social commentary, news and other
such uses traditionally protected under the First Amendment. Finally,
a provision for damages and fees would help deter would-be
perpetrators by guaranteeing a minimum punishment.
Making the statute as concise and as simple as possible will help
ensure the First Amendment is left room to breathe. Meanwhile,
280. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8316(b)(3) (West 2012).
281. See supra notes 243-44 and accompanying text (describing why a registration
requirement is undesirable).
282. See H.B. 327, 2009-2010 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2009).
283. Specifically listing an exception for " 'transformative' creations" would direct the
courts to use the Transformative Use Test in determining whether uses outside those
listed in the statutory language qualify for protection under the First Amendment. For a
discussion about the benefits of the Transformative Use Test, see supra notes 186-90 and
accompanying text.
284. The exception for incidental use is an effort to prevent frivolous claims. See, e.g.,
Preston v. Martin Bergman Prods., Inc., 765 F. Supp. 116, 119 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (finding
that the image of a woman shown in the opening scenes of a motion picture was not
actionable because her appearance was incidental).
285.The list of exemptions includes the traditional press exemptions found in a variety
of other state statutes. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344.1(1) (West 2014); IND. CODE ANN.
§ 32-36-1-13 (LexisNexis 2012); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8316 (d) (West 2012).
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making the right explicit and uniformly applicable will provide North
Carolina's citizens with the protection they deserve in our ever-
changing and increasingly digital world.
CONCLUSION
Just as technological advances in the early twentieth century led
to legal protection for privacy,8 technological advances in the
twenty-first century have led to the need for a meaningful right of
publicity. In the past, photos and videos were only available in hard
copy and wide distribution was both complicated and costly. Now,
with the rise of social media, smartphones, and other technologies,
vast amounts of people have "public" personas, with hundreds of
photos and several videos containing their images available on sites
like Facebook, Google+, and other user-generated content sites. This
change in technology and in the way we interact has created rampant
opportunity for unauthorized use and dissemination of individuals'
identities. This widespread misuse has prompted many states to adopt
right of publicity protections, and it is time for North Carolina to
follow suit by adopting a statutory right of publicity that effectively
protects the identity rights of all its citizens without choking the First
Amendment. As one commentator remarked, quoting Charles
Dickens, "[t]here is probably nothing so strongly intuited as the
notion that my identity is mine. If I cannot control my own identity
and prevent [its] use by others, then the 'law is a ass.' "2"
286. See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 12, at 195.
287. See supra Part III.B (discussing how modem technological advances make
capturing and disseminating someone's likeness relatively simple and inexpensive).
288. MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 2:5 at 101.
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TABLE I. FIFTY STATES: CURRENT RIGHT OF PUBLICITY LAWS
Common Statutory Post Mortem
State Law Protection / Year Rights/ Nature of
Protection Enacted or Most Length of Right
Recently Revised Protection
Alabama Yes 289  Privacy2 90
Alaska 291




California Yes 297 Yes / 2010298 Yes / 70 years299 Property'0
289. See Allison v. Vintage Sports Plaques, 136 F.3d 1443, 1447 (11th Cir. 1998) (noting
that Alabama does not distinguish between misappropriation and right of publicity
claims).
290. See id. (noting that right of publicity claims fall under the privacy action of
misappropriation).
291. To the author's knowledge, Alaska has not addressed the right of publicity in
statute or common law.
292. See Pooley v. Nat'l Hole-In-One Ass'n, 89 F. Supp. 2d 1108, 1111-12 (D. Ariz.
2000) (recognizing a common law right of publicity under Arizona law).
293. See ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-761 (civil), 13-3726 (criminal) (2012). However,
Arizona's civil statutory protection is limited only to the "name, portrait or picture of any
soldier." Id. § 12-761 (emphasis added).
294. See id. (noting that consent may be obtained from the soldier's spouse, immediate
family member, or trustee). There is no defined time limit on how long after death consent
for use must be sought. See id.
295. See Pooley, 89 F. Supp. 2d at 1115 (noting that the right of publicity is considered
a "property right").
296. See Olan Mills, Inc. v. Dodd, 353 S.W.2d 22, 22 (Ark. 1962) (allowing plaintiff to
recover for the unauthorized use of her photo in an advertising campaign by a photo
studio).
297. See White v. Samsung Elecs. Am. Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1397 (9th Cir. 1992) (listing
the elements of a common law right of publicity claim).
298. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344 (West 2014).
299. Id. § 3344.1(f)(3).
300. Id. § 3344.1(b).
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Common Statutory Post Mortem
State Law Protection I Year Rights/ Nature of
Protection Enacted or Most Length of Right
Recently Revised Protection
Colorado Yes 301  Privacy30
Connecticut Yes 303  Privacy3o4
Delaware 305
District of Yes3 6 Privacy
3 07
Columbia
Florida Yes308 Yes/ 1967309 Yes / 40 years310 Both311
Georgia Yes 312  Yes/ not Property3
14
stated313
Hawaii Yes315 Yes/ 2010316 Yes / 70 years
317  Property 318
301. See Joe Dickerson & Assocs., LLC v. Dittmar, 34 P.3d 995, 999 (Colo. 2001)
("Over the years, almost every state has recognized, either statutorily or by case law, that
one way an individual's privacy may be invaded is when a defendant appropriates a
plaintiffs name or likeness for that defendant's own benefit.").
302. Id. (noting that an individual's privacy may be invaded).
303. See Korn v. Rennison, 156 A.2d 476, 477-78 (Conn. 1959) (recognizing a common
law tort for an invasion of the right of privacy).
304. See id.
305. To the author's knowledge, Delaware has not addressed the right of publicity in
statute or common law.
306. See Polsby v. Spruill, No. CIV. 96-1641(TFH), 1997 WL 680550, at *4 (D.D.C.
1997) (noting that the District of Columbia does not recognize separate causes of action
for misappropriation and the right of publicity), affd, 97-7148, 1998 WL 202285 (D.C. Cir.
Mar. 11, 1998).
307. See id.; see also Lane v. Random House, Inc., 985 F. Supp. 141, 148 (D.D.C. 1995)
(recognizing the right of publicity is based in a claim of invasion of privacy).
308. See Gridiron.com v. Nat'l Football League Player's Ass'n, 106 F. Supp. 2d 1309,
1315 (S.D. Fla. 2000).
309. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 540.08 (West 2014).
310. Id. § 540.08(4).
311. From the case law it appears that the common law right is based in privacy but the
statutory right grants a property right. Compare Nat'l Football League v. Alley, Inc., 624
F. Supp. 6, 10 (S.D. Fla. 1983) (indicating that the common law right of publicity is a
personal one [like privacy] and may not be assigned to another) with Loft v. Fuller, 408 So.
2d 619, 622 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 6521
(1977)) (noting that the appropriation of name and likeness is similar to the impairment of
a property right).
312. See Martin Luther King, Jr. Ctr. for Soc. Change, Inc. v. Am. Heritage Prods.,
Inc., 296 S.E.2d 697, 703 (Ga. 1982).
313. See id. at 703-04.
314. See id. at 703.
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Common Statutory Post Mortem
State Law Protection I Year Rights/ Nature of
Protection Enacted or Most Length of Right
Recently Revised Protection
Idaho319
Illinois Yes/ 1999320 Yes / 50 yearS32 1  Property3 2 2
Indiana YesI Yes/ 2012324 Yes / 100 Property326
years325
Iowa 327
Kansas Yes328  Privacy329
Kentucky Yes330  Yes/ 1984331 Yes / 50 years332  Property333
315. See Fergerstrom v. Hawaiian Ocean View Estates, 441 P.2d 141, 144 (Haw. 1968)
("[Pirotection is available for appropriation of name or picture for commercial
purposes.").
316. HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 482P (LexisNexis 2011).
317. Id. § 482P-4.
318. Id. § 482P-2.
319. To the author's knowledge, Idaho has not addressed the right of publicity in
statute or common law.
320. See 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 1075 / 1-60 (West 2012). The statutory right of
publicity has been held to replace the common law privacy action of misappropriation. See
Blair v. Ne. Landing P'ship, 859 N.E.2d 1188, 1192 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006).
321. 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 1075 / 20(a), 1075/30(b) (West 2012).
322. Id. at 1075 / 15 (West 2012).
323. See Cont'l Optical Co. v. Reed, 86 N.E.2d 306, 310 (Ind. App. 1949) (holding that
the unauthorized use of photographs of a person for commercial use is an invasion of
privacy and is actionable).
324. IND. CODE ANN. §§ 32-36-1-1 to -20 (LexisNexis 2002 & Supp. 2012).
325. Id. § 32-36-1-8(a).
326. Id. § 32-36-1-7.
327. To the author's knowledge, Iowa has not addressed the right of publicity in statute
or common law.
328. Kunz v. Allen, 172 P. 532, 532 (Kan. 1918) (allowing an action for plaintiff where
she was photographed in a dry goods store and defendant then used the photographs for
advertising purposes without plaintiffs permission).
329. Id. ("The publication of a picture of a person, without his consent, as a part of an
advertisement, for the purpose of exploiting the publisher's business, is a violation of the
right of privacy . . . " (citation omitted)).
330. Foster-Milburn Co. v. Chinn, 120 S.W. 364, 366-67 (Ky. 1909) (holding that
plaintiff's picture was protected when it was used in a advertisement without plaintiff's
permission).
331. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 391.170 (LexisNexis 2010). However, the right is only
granted to "public figures." Id.
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332. Id. § 391.170(2).
333. Id. § 391.170(1); see also Montgomery v. Montgomery, 60 S.W.3d 524, 528 (Ky.
2001).
334. See Prudhomme v. Procter & Gamble Co., 800 F. Supp. 390, 395-96 (E.D. La.
1992) ("While Louisiana courts have not explicitly adopted this right, they have not
specifically precluded it, either.").
335. See Nelson v. Times, 373 A.2d 1221, 1224 (Me. 1977) (recognizing the
appropriation of another's likeness for defendant's benefit as a cause of action).
336. Id. at 1225 (noting that the right is purely personal and can only be maintained by
a living person whose privacy is invaded).
337. Maryland does not distinguish between a right of publicity and a misappropriation
action. See Lawrence v. A.S. Abell Co., 475 A.2d 448, 451 (Md. 1984) ("[T]he effect of the
appropriation is to recognize or create an exclusive right in the individual plaintiff to a
species of trade name, his own, and a kind of trademark in his likeness." (citation
omitted)).
338. The Fallen Soldier Privacy Act of 2008 prohibits the advertising or commercial
use of the name or image of a soldier killed in the line of duty within the previous 50 years.
MD. CODE ANN. BUS. REG. §§ 19-501 to -504 (LexisNexis 2010).
339. Id. § 19-503.
340. See generally Lawrence, 475 A.2d 448 (recognizing a privacy action against a
newspaper for using a photograph of a mother and her two infants for an advertising
campaign without the mother's permission).
341. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 214, § 3A (LexisNexis 2011).
342. No appellate level court has ruled on this issue. But cf. Hanna v. Ken's Foods, Inc.,
No. 06-P-1071, 2007 WL 1695311, at *1 n.4 (Mass. App. Ct. June 12, 2007) (unpublished
opinion) (noting that the trial court dismissed plaintiffs § 3A claim on grounds that
plaintiff was not a living person and that the issue was not appealed).
343. See Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831, 834 (6th Cir.
1983).
344. See Herman Miller, Inc. v. Palazzetti Imps. & Exps., Inc., 270 F.3d 298, 325-26
(6th Cir. 2001) (recognizing a post-mortem right of publicity).
345. Id. at 326 ("We believe that the ... right of publicity is more properly analyzed as
a property right and, therefore, is descendible.").
Common Statutory Post Mortem
State Law Protection / Year Rights/ Nature of
Protection Enacted or Most Length of Right
Recently Revised Protection
Louisiana Unclear334
Maine Yes 335  Privacy 36
Maryland Yes337 Yes / 2008338 Yes / 50 years339 Privacy4
Massachusetts Yes / 1974m Uncertain342
Michigan Yes343  Yes / not Property34
5
stated 344
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346. See Hillerich & Bradsby Co. v. Christian Bros. Inc., 943 F. Supp. 1136, 1141 (D.
Minn. 1996) ("Although the Minnesota state courts have not explicitly recognized (or
rejected) this cause of action [a right of publicity], the federal courts in this circuit and
district have concluded that it exists in Minnesota.").
347. See Candebat v. Flanagan, 487 So. 2d 207, 209 (Miss. 1986) (holding that
misappropriation of identity for commercial purposes was a valid cause of action).
348. There are no cases or statutes in Mississippi that directly address the question of
descendibility. However, MISS. CODE ANN. § 91-7-237 (West 1999 & Supp. 2012) states
that only "personal" actions can survive the death of a party, and in Flagg-Allen v. Carson,
No. 5:07CV179-DCB-JMR, 2008 WL 907656, at *1 (S.D. Miss. Mar. 28, 2008), the court
held that a cause of action for misappropriation was a "personal action," id.
349. See Candebat, 487 So. 2d at 209.
350. See Munden v. Harris, 134 S.W. 1076, 1079 (Mo. Ct. App. 1911) ("We therefore
conclude that one has an exclusive right to his picture, on the score of its being a property
right of material profit. We also consider it to be a property right of value . . .
351. See id.
352. To the author's knowledge, Montana has not addressed the right of publicity in
statute or common law.
353. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 20-202 (2007).
354. Id. § 20-208.
355. Id. § 20-202 (referring to the right as an "invasion of privacy").
356. See NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 597.770 to .810 (2010 & Supp. 2011).
357. See id. § 597.790(1). But cf Fifty-Six Hope Rd. Music, Ltd. v. A.V.E.L.A., Inc.,
688 F. Supp. 2d 1148, 1162 (D. Nev. 2010) ("[Ulpon discovering an unauthorized use by
anyone, a successor must register within six months or forever waive his claim to publicity
rights in the deceased person.").
358. See People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v. Bobby Berosini, Ltd., 895 P.2d
1269, 1283 (Nev. 1995) (noting that in Nevada misappropriation was a personal right while
the right of publicity was a property right relating to economic loss).
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359. Doe v. Friendfinder Network Inc., 540 F. Supp. 2d 288, 303 (D.N.H. 2008) ("New
Hampshire recognizes a cause of action for infringement of the right of publicity as set
forth in the Restatement (Second) of Torts." (citing Remsburg v. Docusearch, Inc., 149
N.H. 148, 157 (2003))).
360. See Palmer v. Schonhorn Enter. Inc., 232 A.2d 458, 462 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div.
1967) (holding that professional golfers' rights to privacy were violated when their names
were used in connection with defendant corporation's product).
361. See McFarland v. Miller, 14 F.3d 912, 923 (3d Cir. 1994) (finding the right of
publicity to be descendible).
362. See id.
363. See Benally v. Hundred Arrows Press, Inc., 614 F. Supp. 969, 978 (D.C.N.M.
1985), rev'd on other grounds, sub nom. Benally ex rel. Benally v. Amon Carter Museum
of W. Art, 858 F.2d 618 (10th Cir. 1988).
364. In dicta, the New Mexico Court of Appeals observed that a claim for the invasion
of privacy is not descendible but then explicitly made an exception to that rule for the
appropriation of one's name or likeness. See Smith v. City of Artesia, 772 P.2d 373, 375
(N.M. Ct. App. 1989).
365. Benally, 614 F. Supp. at 978 ("The right created ... is in the nature of a property
right.").
366. See N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50-51 (McKinney 2014).
367. See id. § 50.
368. See Flake v. Greensboro News Co., 212 N.C. 780, 792, 195 S.E. 55, 64 (1938).
369. See id.
370. To the author's knowledge, North Dakota has not addressed the right of publicity
in statute or common law.
371. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 578-79 (1977).
372. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2741.01 to .09 (LexisNexis 2008 & Supp. 2012).
373. Id. § 2741.02.
374. Id. § 2741.01(D).
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Common Statutory Post Mortem
State Law Protection I Year Rights/ Nature of
Protection Enacted or Most Length of Right
Recently Revised Protection
Oklahoma Yes/ 1986375 Yes / 100 Property377
years376
Oregon378
Pennsylvania Yes 379  Yes / 2003380 Yes / 30 years381
Rhode Island Yes / 1980382
South Carolina Yes383  Yes / not Property3 85
stated3s
South Dakota386
Tennessee Yes/ 1984387 Yes / 10 years 388  Property38 9
Texas Yes390  Yes/ 1987391 Yes / 50 yearS392  Property393
375. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21 §§ 839.1-839.3 (West Supp. 2013).
376. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21 § 1448(G) (West 2010).
377. See id. § 839.1 (describing the right of living persons as a privacy right); id.
§ 1448(B) (labeling the right for deceased persons as a property right).
378. To the author's knowledge, Oregon has not addressed the right of publicity in
statute or common law.
379. See Eagle's Eye, Inc. v. Ambler Fashion Shop, Inc., 627 F. Supp. 856, 862 (E.D.
Pa. 1985) ("[T]he right of publicity inures to an individual who seeks to protect and
control the commercial value of his name or likeness.").
380. See 42 PA. STAT. ANN. § 8316 (West 2007).
381. Id. § 8316(b)(3), (c).
382. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-1-28 (1997 & Supp. 2011).
383. Gignilliat v. Gignilliat, Savitz, & Bettis, L.L.P., 684 S.E.2d 756, 762 (S.C. 2009)
("We hold that South Carolina does recognize the right of publicity, that the right survives
death and that nominal damages are presumed.").
384. Id.
385. Id. at 763.
386. To the author's knowledge, South Dakota has not addressed the right of publicity
in statute or common law.
387. TENN. CODE. ANN. §§ 47-25-1101 to -1108 (2012).
388. See id. § 47-25-1104; see also supra notes 129-30 and accompanying text.
389. TENN. CODE. ANN. § 47-25-1103(a) (2012).
390. See Henley v. Dillard Dep't Stores, 46 F.Supp.2d 587, 590 (N.D. Tex. 1999)
(noting that Texas does not distinguish between misappropriation and right of publicity
actions and that the right of publicity safeguards "the commercial interests of celebrities in
their identities").
391. See TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 26.001 to .015 (West 2000).
392. Id. § 26.012(d).
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Common Statutory Post Mortem
State Law Protection I Year Rights/ Nature of
Protection Enacted or Most Length of Right
Recently Revised Protection
Utah Yes394 Yes/ 1999395 Yes/ not
stated39 6
Vermont Yes397
Virginia Yes/ 1977398 Yes / 20 yearsm Property400
Washington Yes / 20084' Yes / 10 or 75 Property403
years_ _
West Virginia Yes404
Wisconsin Yes405 Yes/ 20064' Now Privacy7
393. Id. § 26.002.
394. See Nature's Way Prods., Inc., v. Nature-Pharma, Inc., 736 F. Supp. 245, 251 (D.
Utah 1990).
395. See UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 45-3-1 to -6 (LexisNexis 2010).
396. See Nature's Way, 736 F. Supp. at 251-53 (holding that plaintiff could bring a claim
involving a deceased individual's persona).
397. See Staruski v. Cont'l Tel. Co., 581 A.2d 266, 269 & n.5 (Vt. 1990) (noting the
existence of a right of publicity cause of action and distinguishing it from
misappropriation).
398. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-40, 18.2-216.1 (2009).
399. Id. § 8.01-40(B).
400. See PTS Corp. v. Buckman, 561 S.E.2d 718, 722 (Va. 2002) ("The statutory cause
of action is premised upon the concept that a person holds a property interest in his or her
name and likeness.").
401. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 63.60.010 to .080 (LexisNexis 2005 & Supp. 2013).
402. See id at § 63.60.040(1)-(2) (noting that an "individual" has post-mortem rights for
10 years while a "personality" has rights for 75 years). "Individual" and "personality" are
defined in the statute and could be easily read as "non-celebrity" and "celebrity,"
respectively. See id. § 63.60.020(1)-(2).
403. Id. § 63.60.030.
404. See Curran v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 2:07-0354, 2008 WL 472433, at *4 (S.D.
W.Va. Feb. 18, 2008) ("[T]he court concludes that a common law right of publicity is
cognizable in West Virginia.").
405. See Conrad v. Isthmus Pub., Inc., No. 09-CV-566-BBC, 2009 WL 3254024, at *4
(W.D. Wis. Oct. 5, 2009) ("Wisconsin recognizes a right of publicity under both statutory
and common law.").
406. See WIS. STAT. ANN. § 995.50 (West 2007).
407. See id. § 995.50(b) (protection is specifically for "a living person"); see also Heinz
v. Frank Lloyd Wright Found., 85-C-482-C, 1986 WL 5996, at *7 (W.D. Wis. 1986).
408. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 995.50(1) (West 2007).
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State Law Protection / Year Rights/ Nature of




TABLE II. SUMMARY OF STATE PUBLICITY RIGHTS
Protection for Publicity Rights Number of States
Statutory or Common Law Protection 41410
Statutory Protection enacted or revised within last twenty years 11
Protection based in privacy 11411
Protection based in property 22412
409. To the author's knowledge, Wyoming has not addressed the right of publicity in
statute or common law.
410. Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, District of
Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana,
Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska,
Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Ohio,
Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Utah,
Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin.
411. Alabama, Colorado, Connecticut, District of Columbia, Florida, Kansas, Maine,
Maryland, Mississippi, Nebraska, New York, North Carolina, Wisconsin.
412. Arizona, California, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky,
Michigan, Missouri, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina,
Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, Washington.
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APPENDIX A. SAMPLE STATUTE
1. Likeness: A natural person's name, portrait, photograph, or voice.
Photograph is any photograph or photographic reproduction,
digital or otherwise, still or moving, or any video recording or live
transmission, of any person, such that the person is readily
identifiable by the naked eye.
2. Prohibition: Any person, firm, or corporation who knowingly uses
another individual's likeness without obtaining prior written
consent of any of the parties authorized in subsection (a) shall be
liable for any damages or loss sustained by the person or persons
to whom the personality belongs.
(a) Parties authorized to bring action for a violation of section
2:
i. The natural person;
ii. A parent or guardian of a natural person, if the
natural person is a minor;
iii. Any person, firm, or corporation authorized in
writing by such natural person to license the
person's likeness; or
iv. If such natural person is deceased, any person,
firm, or corporation authorized in writing to
license the use of the natural person's likeness
during the natural person's lifetime or by will or
other testamentary device; or where there is no
such authorization, then by the deceased person's
surviving spouse at the time of death until the
surviving spouse's death or, in a case where there
is no surviving spouse, then any other heir or
group of heirs having at least a 50% interest in the
deceased person's estate as provided under this
State's Probate Code.
3. Duration of Right: No action shall be commenced under this
section more than fifty years after the death of such natural
person.
4. Exemptions: It shall not be a violation of this section to use the
likeness of a person in connection with:
(a) Any news, public affairs/interest, historical, or sports
broadcast or account;
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(b) Any original expressive work that is transformative of the
original likeness;
(c) Any use that is incidental; or
(d) Any advertisement or announcement for a use permitted
under this section.
5. Limited Immunity: Owners or employees of any medium used for
advertising, including, but not limited to, newspapers, magazines,
radio and television networks and stations, cable television
systems, billboards, and transit ads, by whom any use of an
individual's likeness for commercial purposes in violation of this
section is published or disseminated, shall not be liable unless it is
established that the owners or employees had knowledge of the
unauthorized use as prohibited by this section.
6. Remedies:
(a) Actual Damages: Any party injured by a violation of this
right shall be entitled to the greater of:
i. One thousand dollars ($1,000); or
ii. The actual damages resulting from the
unauthorized use.
(b) Other Remedies: A court may also grant injunctive relief.
Punitive damages may be awarded if the unauthorized use
was willful or wanton.
WILLIAM K. SMITH*
** As with any undertaking of this size, thanks are in order. First, and always, my
thanks to Hillary for her unwavering support. Second, a large thank you to Lauren Shor
and the Law Review editors for their tireless efforts and long suffering on my behalf.
Third, an equally large thank you to Sam Scheller, for providing the kernel that began this
project, and Professor David S. Ardia, who helped flush out the initial ground work.
Finally, thank you to Claire, Avery, and Henry for providing welcome distractions with
your laughter and smiles.
[Vol. 922118
